California Legal Brief

The Rule of In re Reyna R. is that a juvenile court errs in ordering a parent to pay for professional visitation monitoring without first considering the parent's ability to pay or reasonable alternatives when the parent raises a timely objection based on financial inability, under circumstances where the parent objects to professional monitoring costs at the exit order hearing.

Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.

Defendant Appellant was Cesar R. — the father whose visitation was ordered to be monitored by a professional monitor at his expense.

Plaintiff Respondent was Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services — the child welfare agency that recommended monitored visitation but took no position on appeal.

The suit sounded in dependency proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), based on Father's domestic violence and alcohol abuse placing the children at substantial risk of harm.

The key substantive facts leading to the suit were Father slapped Mother on the cheek during an August 2023 domestic violence incident while suspected of being intoxicated, witnessed by the oldest child who called police. This occurred after a prior dependency case involving Father's alcohol abuse had been closed. During the current case, Father left threatening voicemails to his daughter while apparently intoxicated, made threats to burn down the home, and physically confronted Mother on multiple occasions, leading to a three-year restraining order.

The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court terminated dependency jurisdiction with a custody exit order granting sole legal and physical custody to Mother and ordering Father's visitation to be monitored by a professional monitor paid for by Father, ruling that Father's recent behaviors necessitated professional monitoring and it would be unfair to require Mother to pay for monitoring.

The key question(s) on Appeal: Whether the juvenile court erred in ordering Father to pay for a professional visitation monitor without considering his ability to pay or reasonable alternatives after he raised a timely objection based on limited finances.

The Appellate Court held the juvenile court abused its discretion by failing to conduct any inquiry into Father's ability to pay for professional monitoring or consider reasonable alternatives such as an unpaid monitor approved by DCFS and/or Mother, when Father's counsel immediately objected that the order amounted to "a no visits order" due to limited finances and there was evidence Father might not afford this expense as the sole income provider for a family qualifying for food assistance.

The case is inapplicable when the parent does not raise a timely objection to professional monitoring costs, when there is clear evidence the parent can afford professional monitoring, or when the court conducts an adequate inquiry into ability to pay and reasonable alternatives before ordering paid professional monitoring.

The case leaves open what specific alternatives to paid professional monitors might be reasonable if a parent lacks ability to pay, whether Mother's involvement in approving unpaid monitors would be appropriate given Father's past manipulation, and under what circumstances a court could find no reasonable alternatives exist requiring the parent to bear professional monitoring costs as a condition of visitation.