California Legal Brief

The Rule of **People v. Diaz** is that trial courts are not required to expressly state they have considered a defendant's youth when determining whether the defendant acted with express malice/intent to kill in section 1172.6 proceedings, under circumstances where the court is aware of the defendant's age and counsel argues youth as a mitigating factor but the court finds the defendant personally intended the victims' deaths.

Appeal from order denying petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 in Superior Court, Los Angeles County.

Defendant Appellant was Monica Diaz — the 16-year-old who aided her boyfriend in murdering four family members by letting him into the home and handling weapons and duct tape used in the attack.

Plaintiff Respondent was The People — the prosecution seeking to uphold Diaz's murder convictions under current law.

The suit sounded in criminal law regarding murder convictions and resentencing under section 1172.6.

The key substantive facts leading to the suit were that in 2000, 16-year-old Diaz and her 17-year-old boyfriend Naranjo planned what Diaz claimed was a fake robbery to unite her fractured family, but Naranjo stabbed and killed Diaz's uncle and three cousins (her aunt survived). Diaz's fingerprints were found on knives and duct tape at the scene. Letters between the couple showed mutual admiration for murderers and desire to kill people. At trial, both testified but gave conflicting versions - Naranjo claimed Diaz didn't know he planned to kill, while evidence suggested joint planning.

The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court denied Diaz's section 1172.6 resentencing petition after an evidentiary hearing, ruling that Diaz was a direct aider and abettor who acted with express malice (intent to kill) and alternatively was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

The key question(s) on Appeal: Whether the trial court erred in failing to expressly consider Diaz's youth when determining if she possessed the intent to kill (express malice) or reckless indifference to human life under section 1172.6.

The Appellate Court held that because express malice requires personal intent that conduct result in death, youth is less relevant than in reckless indifference cases, and courts need not expressly state consideration of youth when the record shows awareness of defendant's age and the court finds defendant personally wanted victims dead rather than acting under peer influence.

The case is inapplicable when the defendant's youth argument focuses on reckless indifference to human life rather than express malice, when the court makes no finding of personal intent to kill, or when there is no evidence in the record that the court was aware of the defendant's age.

The case leaves open whether courts must expressly consider youth in determining reckless indifference to human life in section 1172.6 proceedings, and what specific factual showings might require express consideration of youth even in express malice cases.