California Legal Brief

The Rule of People v. Pineda is that at section 1172.6 resentencing evidentiary hearings, previously admitted hearsay testimony from preliminary hearings is admissible if it meets a current hearsay exception, including the declaration against interest exception when the statements subjected the declarant to risk of criminal liability.

Appeal from order denying section 1172.6 resentencing petition in Superior Court, Los Angeles County.

Defendant Appellant was Alvin Pineda — the gang member who shot multiple people at a baptismal party after retrieving a fallen gun during a gang confrontation.

Plaintiff Respondent was The People — the prosecuting authority opposing resentencing relief under the modified murder liability laws.

The suit sounded in criminal law under Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing petition following Senate Bill 1437's modification of murder liability rules.

The key substantive facts leading to the suit were Pineda was originally convicted of voluntary manslaughter and attempted murder based on a gang-related shooting at a baptismal party. The primary evidence against him was testimony from codefendant Salinas's statements to a jailhouse informant during a Perkins operation, identifying Pineda as the shooter after Pineda retrieved a gun that fell during a gang confrontation.

The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court denied Pineda's section 1172.6 resentencing petition, ruling that previously admitted hearsay testimony from the preliminary hearing qualified as declarations against interest under Evidence Code section 1230, providing substantial evidence that Pineda could still be convicted under current law.

The key question(s) on Appeal: Whether the trial court properly admitted hearsay testimony from a preliminary hearing at the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing under the declaration against interest exception.

The Appellate Court held that codefendant's jailhouse statements identifying Pineda as the shooter were properly admitted as declarations against interest because they showed the declarant had engineered gang assaults and subjected him to criminal liability risk, making them statements a reasonable person would not make unless believed to be true.

The case is inapplicable when the previously admitted hearsay testimony does not meet a current Evidence Code exception, when statements do not subject the declarant to meaningful risk of criminal liability, or when the declarant's statements would not reasonably be made unless believed true.

The case leaves open questions about the precise scope of what constitutes sufficient criminal liability risk for the declaration against interest exception, and the standards for determining when previously inadmitted evidence might be considered at section 1172.6 hearings.