California Legal Brief

The Rule of In re Lynex is that to obtain appointed counsel under the California Racial Justice Act, an indigent habeas petitioner need only plead a "plausible allegation" of a violation of Penal Code section 745(a), which is an "extremely low" and "minimal pleading requirement" that does not require a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, under circumstances where the petitioner seeks counsel to prosecute racial bias claims in criminal proceedings.

Appeal from order denying petition for writ of habeas corpus in Superior Court, Los Angeles County.

Petitioner was Tommie Lawson Lynex — a Black man convicted of first degree murder with firearm enhancement who filed a habeas petition claiming racial bias in charging and sentencing under the California Racial Justice Act.

Respondent was Superior Court of Los Angeles County — the trial court that denied Lynex's petition and request for appointed counsel.

The suit sounded in habeas corpus relief under the California Racial Justice Act. No cross-claims.

The key substantive facts leading to the suit were Lynex's 2000 conviction for first degree murder with a firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53(d), his claim that charging decisions violated the Racial Justice Act, and his attachment of Los Angeles County District Attorney data showing racial disparities in murder charges with firearm enhancements from 1998-2000 (far more Black defendants charged than White defendants).

The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court denied Lynex's habeas petition in its entirety, ruling that Lynex failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief to secure appointment of counsel, that his claims were procedurally barred as successive petitions, and that he failed to adequately allege racial bias.

The key question(s) on Appeal: 1. What standard applies to appointment of counsel for Racial Justice Act habeas petitions? 2. Must petitioners address procedural bars at the initial screening stage? 3. Does the trial court have discretion to allow amendment of deficient petitions?

The Appellate Court held that trial courts must appoint counsel for indigent Racial Justice Act habeas petitioners who plead a "plausible allegation" of violation—an extremely low threshold that is merely a minimal pleading requirement, not a prima facie showing—and that courts have discretion to permit amendment of deficient petitions before ruling on counsel requests, and petitioners need not address procedural bars at the initial screening stage.

The case is inapplicable when the petitioner is not indigent, is not seeking counsel under the Racial Justice Act, has already been appointed counsel, or is raising claims outside the scope of Penal Code section 745(a).

The case leaves open what specific factual allegations would satisfy the "plausible allegation" standard, whether firearm enhancements constitute "offenses" or "sentences" under section 745, and how trial courts should exercise discretion in allowing amendments to cure deficient petitions.