The Rule of People v. Aguilar is that a prosecutor's peremptory challenge based on alleged "juror confusion" is presumptively invalid under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1)(C), and requires the trial court to confirm that the asserted confused behavior actually occurred based on the court's own observations, under circumstances where the prospective juror is perceived as a member of a protected group and gives clear, consistent answers regarding the legal concept in question.
Appeal from judgment after jury trial in Superior Court, San Diego County.
Defendant Appellant was Enrique Aguilar — the defendant who was convicted of multiple charges arising from a shootout with police officers.
Plaintiff Respondent was The People — the prosecution in the criminal case.
The suit sounded in criminal charges including attempted voluntary manslaughter, assault on peace officers with firearms, and related weapons offenses. No cross-claims were applicable.
The key substantive facts leading to the suit were Aguilar engaged in a foot chase with a San Diego Police Department officer during which he brandished a gun, leading to an exchange of gunfire between Aguilar and two officers, resulting in Aguilar being wounded and one bullet striking a nearby store.
The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court overruled defendant's objection to the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of Juror 1 (a perceived Latina woman), ruling that the prosecutor's stated reason that the juror was "struggling" with the concept of intent and giving "equivocal" answers was supported by the record and that under the totality of circumstances, an objectively reasonable person would not view the juror's perceived ethnicity as a factor in the challenge.
The key question(s) on Appeal: Whether the trial court's finding that Juror 1 was confused about the concept of intent was supported by substantial evidence, and whether the People rebutted the presumption that their peremptory challenge was invalid under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7.
The Appellate Court held that the trial court's finding of juror confusion was entirely unsupported by substantial evidence, as the record showed Juror 1 gave clear, consistent answers about intent that were understood by other prospective jurors, and because "confused answers" is a presumptively invalid reason under section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1)(C), the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of invalidity.
The case is inapplicable when the prospective juror actually demonstrates confusion in their responses as confirmed by the trial court's observations, when the juror is not a member of a protected group, or when the prosecutor provides reasons that are not presumptively invalid under section 231.7.
The case leaves open questions about what level of detail is required for trial courts to adequately confirm alleged juror behavior, and the specific procedures for objecting to presumptively invalid reasons under the various subdivisions of section 231.7.
Counsel
For Appellant: Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal
For Respondent: Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Eric A. Swenson, Kathryn Kirschbaum and Marvin E. Mizell, Deputy Attorneys General
Amicus curiae: [Not determinable from opinion text]