The Rule of Voice of San Diego is that an agency's compliance with the CPRA's duty to make records "promptly available" under Government Code section 7922.530(a) must be determined case-by-case considering the scope and burden imposed on the particular agency by the particular request, under circumstances where the CPRA does not impose a fixed timeframe for actual production of requested records.
Appeal from judgment after hearing on petition for writ of mandate in Superior Court, San Diego County.
Plaintiff Appellants were Voice of San Diego and Scott Lewis — the online news service and its editor-in-chief who submitted over 75 CPRA requests to the District from 2015-2020.
Defendant Respondent was San Diego Unified School District — the second largest school district in California with 181 schools that received an average of 320 public records requests per year.
The suit sounded in public records disclosure under the California Public Records Act and taxpayer action under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. Voice alleged the District routinely obstructs and delays disclosure of public records.
The key substantive facts leading to the suit were Voice's allegations that the District's average time in producing records responsive to its CPRA requests over a five-year period was 399 days, and that the District maintains an unlawful practice of delaying and obstructing public records disclosure in violation of the CPRA's requirement that records be made "promptly available."
The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court denied the petition for writ of mandate, ruling that the CPRA does not precisely define the timeframe for actual production of requested records and that substantial evidence did not prove the District engages in any unlawful practice of delaying or withholding public records.
The key question(s) on Appeal: 1. Whether Government Code section 7922.530(a)'s requirement that records be made "promptly available" means production must occur within "days or a few weeks" of the initial determination 2. Whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's factual finding that the District did not maintain an unlawful practice of violating the CPRA
The Appellate Court held that "promptly available" under section 7922.530(a) requires a fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis considering factors including the specificity and breadth of the request, the nature and location of records sought, the volume of data to be searched, the level of review required for exemptions and redactions, and the size and complexity of the responding agency, and that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that the District did not engage in unlawful delay practices.
The case is inapplicable when the CPRA request involves narrow, well-defined requests for easily accessible records to agencies with limited operations and few public records requests, or when there is clear evidence of intentional delay or obstruction tactics by the agency.
The case leaves open the precise boundaries of what constitutes "prompt" production in specific factual scenarios, the exhaustive list of factors courts may consider in assessing promptness, and how external circumstances beyond an agency's control should be weighted in the promptness analysis.
Counsel
For Appellant: Law Office of Felix Tinkov, Felix Tinkov; Glen Smith
For Respondent: Quarles & Brady, Jeffrey P. Michalowski and Jessika B. Russell
Amicus curiae: John David Loy for First Amendment Coalition