California Legal Brief

The Rule of Harrington v. Housing Authority of Riverside County is that under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, a trial court conducting independent judgment review must determine whether the agency's factual findings are supported by the evidence, not independently find facts to support the agency's ultimate decision, under circumstances where fundamental vested rights like Section 8 housing assistance are at stake.

Appeal from judgment denying petition for writ of administrative mandamus in Superior Court, Riverside County.

Defendant Appellant was Shevon Harrington — the Section 8 housing assistance recipient whose benefits were terminated following an eviction judgment that was later reversed.

Plaintiff Respondent was Housing Authority of Riverside County — the public housing authority that terminated Harrington's Section 8 assistance based on a hearing officer's finding that her eviction was upheld on appeal.

The suit sounded in administrative mandamus seeking to overturn termination of Section 8 housing benefits. No cross-claims applicable.

The key substantive facts leading to the suit were: Harrington received Section 8 assistance beginning in 2017; she failed housing inspections in May 2022 but later passed; her landlord served a 30-day notice in December 2022 citing unsanitary conditions and excessive damages; she was late submitting annual reexamination information and initially declined an inspection due to eviction stress; a trial court entered unlawful detainer judgment against her in April 2023; the HA terminated her assistance based on mandatory termination regulations for evicted tenants; at the administrative hearing in July 2023, the hearing officer found termination was mandatory because the eviction was "upheld on appeal"; however, Harrington's appeal was still pending and the appellate division later reversed the eviction judgment for insufficient evidence in February 2024.

The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court denied Harrington's petition for writ of administrative mandamus, ruling that under the independent judgment standard, it could independently review the record to find support for termination based on three family obligation violations not addressed by the hearing officer.

The key question(s) on Appeal: Whether the trial court misunderstood the scope of judicial review under section 1094.5 by making independent factual findings to support the agency's decision rather than reviewing whether the hearing officer's factual findings were supported by evidence.

The Appellate Court held that section 1094.5 requires courts to determine whether the agency's factual findings are supported by the evidence, not to make independent factual findings to support the agency's ultimate decision, and that allowing termination based on violations not adjudicated at the administrative hearing violates due process.

The case is inapplicable when the agency's hearing officer actually made factual findings on the grounds ultimately used to support the decision, or when the matter does not involve fundamental vested rights requiring independent judgment review.

The case leaves open questions about what evidence would be sufficient to establish the three family obligation violations identified by the trial court, and the application of discretionary termination factors under 24 C.F.R. part 982.552(c).