The Rule of Findlay Grant et al. v. Chapman University is that a university's statements about class locations, campus facilities, and "face-to-face contact" requirements do not constitute sufficiently "specific" promises to create an enforceable implied contract for in-person education, under circumstances where the statements are general expectations rather than binding commitments and facilities descriptions contain express disclaimers.
Appeal from judgment after summary judgment in Superior Court, Orange County.
Plaintiff Appellants were Findlay Grant and Christian Walsh — enrolled students at Chapman University who sought partial tuition refunds after the university transitioned to online instruction during COVID-19.
Defendant Respondent was Chapman University — the private university that suspended in-person education and transitioned to remote instruction following local lockdown orders in March 2020.
The suit sounded in breach of contract. Cross-claims included unjust enrichment and unfair business practices.
The key substantive facts leading to the suit were Chapman's closure of its campus in March 2020 following COVID-19 lockdown orders, its transition to online instruction, and its communications ahead of Fall 2020 describing reopening as a "goal" that remained contingent on authorities' "support and approval." Plaintiffs remained enrolled and graduated but sought partial tuition refunds claiming breach of an implied contract for in-person education.
The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court granted summary judgment for Chapman, ruling that Berlanga v. University of San Francisco foreclosed plaintiffs' claims and finding no triable issue that Chapman had misrepresented its educational program.
The key question(s) on Appeal: Whether Chapman's various statements and practices—including course registration portals listing class locations, credit-hour policies requiring "face-to-face contact," facility descriptions in catalogs, and historical practice of in-person instruction—created an enforceable implied contract promise for in-person education.
The Appellate Court held that Chapman's extensive statements about class locations, campus facilities, and face-to-face contact requirements were not sufficiently "specific" to constitute enforceable implied promises, where the statements reflected general expectations rather than binding commitments, facility descriptions contained express disclaimers, and communications about reopening were aspirational and contingent rather than definitive promises.
The case is inapplicable when the university makes unequivocal, specific promises about educational delivery methods (like the fee promise in Kashmiri), offers different pricing structures between in-person and online programs that support an inference of promised in-person instruction, or makes definitive rather than aspirational and contingent statements about educational delivery.
The case leaves open whether more specific or unequivocal promises about in-person education could create enforceable implied contracts, what level of pricing differential between online and in-person programs might support an inference of promised in-person instruction, and how courts should handle cases where universities do not include express disclaimers in their promotional materials.
Counsel
For Appellant: Shegerian & Associates, Carney Shegerian; The Golan Firm, Yvette Golan
For Respondent: Quarles & Brady, Jeffrey P. Michalowski, Jessika Russell