The Rule of In re Z.G. is that a juvenile court may not terminate parental rights merely by finding a likelihood of adoption but must also make one of the additional findings referenced in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), under circumstances where a parent has not received statutorily guaranteed reunification services and was not properly bypassed for such services.
Appeal from judgment terminating parental rights after section 366.26 hearing in Superior Court, San Bernardino County.
Defendant Appellant was A.G. — Mother of two children in dependency proceedings who was denied her statutory right to reunification services as to one child.
Plaintiff Respondent was San Bernardino County Children and Family Services — the Department that recommended termination of parental rights despite acknowledging Mother's willingness to complete her case plan and strong bond with the children.
The suit sounded in juvenile dependency proceedings. The case involved consolidated dependency proceedings for two children, Z.G. and A.G.
The key substantive facts leading to the suit were Mother's substance abuse issues that led to Z.G.'s initial removal in 2020, followed by successful reunification and return of custody to Mother, then subsequent removal of both children in March 2023 after allegations Mother stopped cooperating with her case plan and was no longer testing for drugs. Mother received reunification services as to Z.G. but never received such services as to A.G., despite being statutorily entitled to them.
The procedural result leading to the Appeal: The trial court terminated Mother's reunification services as to both children and set a permanency planning hearing, then terminated parental rights as to both children after finding they were likely to be adopted, ruling that a likelihood-of-adoption finding was sufficient for termination without requiring additional statutory findings.
The key question(s) on Appeal: 1. Whether a juvenile court may terminate parental rights pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) based solely on a likelihood-of-adoption finding when a parent did not receive reunification services and was not bypassed for such services. 2. Whether Mother received ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Appellate Court held that a juvenile court may not terminate parental rights merely by finding a likelihood of adoption but must also make one of the additional findings referenced in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), and that Mother received ineffective assistance of counsel when her trial counsel failed to assert her statutory rights to reunification services as to A.G. at the disposition hearing and failed to prosecute writ review of the setting of the permanency planning hearing.
The case is inapplicable when a parent has properly received reunification services or has been appropriately bypassed for such services pursuant to statutory grounds with proper findings by the court, or when the children involved do not have significant sibling relationships that would be substantially interfered with by termination.
The case leaves open the specific procedures courts should follow when remedying ineffective assistance of counsel claims in dependency proceedings and the precise timeframes for assessing "reasonable effort" under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)(A).
Counsel
For Appellant: Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Supreme Court
For Respondent: Tom Bunton, County Counsel, Pamela J. Walls and David R. Guardado, Deputy County Counsel
Amicus curiae: [Not determinable from opinion text]