California Legal Brief

AI-Generated Practitioner Briefs of California Appellate Opinions

Published Opinion Briefs

33 opinions briefed • Updated daily

Anaheim Police Dept. v. Crockett 1/16/26 CA4/3

The Rule of Anaheim Police Department v. Crockett is that a gun violence restraining order may be issued against a firearm owner who fails to adequately secure weapons from a prohibited person who poses a credible threat of violence, under circumstances where the firearm owner enables access to weapons by someone with a documented mental health history and lifetime firearms prohibition who has made specific threats of mass violence.

Zenith Insurance Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd. 1/14/26 CA6

The Rule of Zenith Insurance Company v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board is that equitable tolling of the 60-day deadline under former Labor Code section 5909 cannot justify the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board's 20-month delay in issuing a decision on reconsideration after granting a petition for "further study," under circumstances where the Board failed to demonstrate reasonable and good faith conduct in attempting to comply with statutory procedures.

Microsoft Corp. v. Super. Ct. 1/30/26 CA2/4

The Rule of Microsoft Corporation v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County is that a trial court may issue a nondisclosure order prohibiting an electronic service provider from notifying its enterprise customer of a search warrant's existence, under circumstances where the court has reviewed a sealed affidavit and found that disclosure could cause adverse results enumerated in CalECPA, even when the provider proposes to notify only a "trusted contact" at the customer organization who is not the target of the investigation.

Higginson v. Kia Motors America 1/9/26 CA4/1

The Rule of Higginson is that dismissal of a CLRA claim for failure to file a concurrent venue affidavit must be without prejudice (with leave to amend), not with prejudice, under Civil Code section 1780(d), and that unremedied discovery misuse that deprives a party of material evidence required for trial warrants a new trial and monetary sanctions, under circumstances where a party falsely verifies that responsive documents "never existed" and the court's remedial jury instruction becomes ineffective due to evidentiary exclusions.

Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v. Eisenberg 1/30/26 CA6

The Rule of Santa Clara Valley Water District v. Eisenberg is that the claim and delivery law does not preclude a party from seeking preliminary injunctive relief to recover possession of personal property, under Code of Civil Procedure section 516.050, even after the party has already obtained a writ of possession and turnover order under the claim and delivery statutes.

Spring Oaks Capital SPV, LLC v. Fowler 12/8/25 Santa Clara/AD

The Rule of Spring Oaks Capital SPV, LLC v. Fowler is that a party who fails to properly disclose witness names and addresses in response to a Code of Civil Procedure section 96 request cannot call that undisclosed witness at trial, under circumstances where the responding party only provided the witness's role without specific name identification and the requesting party properly objected.

In re J.C. 2/6/26 CA1/3

The Rule of People v. J.C. is that the firearm prohibition under Penal Code section 29820, subdivision (b), does not apply to minors adjudicated as juvenile court wards for brandishing an imitation firearm under Penal Code section 417.4, under circumstances where section 417.4 is not among the statutorily enumerated offenses in section 29805 that trigger the firearm ban.

Gerard v. Cuevas 11/21/25 L.A./AD

The Rule of Gerard v. Cuevas is that a trial court cannot retroactively shorten a notice period under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987 to 91 minutes and then impose a terminating sanction when the defendant fails to appear, under circumstances where the original notice was untimely served and the court had not previously ordered shortened time.

Parsonage v. Wal-Mart Associates 2/4/26 CA4/1

The Rule of Parsonage v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. is that ICRAA authorizes consumers to recover the statutory sum of $10,000 as a remedy for a violation of their statutory rights, without any further showing of concrete injury or adverse employment decision, under circumstances where an employer fails to comply with any requirement of ICRAA's disclosure and consent provisions.

Tavares v. Zipcar, Inc., et al. 1/30/26 CA3

The Rule of Tavares v. Zipcar is that remote rental car companies exempt under Civil Code section 1939.37 owe no duty to assess whether renters appear impaired at the time of rental or to equip vehicles with impairment detection technology, under circumstances where the rental is conducted through a membership agreement allowing remote vehicle access without in-person employee interaction.

Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC 2/17/26 CA4/1

The Rule of Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC is that a motion for attorney fees must be served within 180 days of when a case is voluntarily dismissed pursuant to court order, even when no formal dismissal order is filed until a later date, under circumstances where the case was deemed dismissed by operation of court rules after settlement.

P. v. Gutierrez 2/17/26 CA4/1

The Rule of People v. Gutierrez is that a Governor's state of emergency proclamation is subject to independent legal interpretation by courts, not jury determination, and when a proclamation limits emergency zones to specific "high hazard areas" to be identified by state agencies rather than declaring a statewide emergency, the prosecution must prove the crime occurred within those specifically identified areas, under circumstances where the proclamation's plain language directs agencies to identify particular zones rather than declaring the emergency exists throughout the entire state.

Disney Platform Distribution, Inc. v. City of Santa Barbara 1/30/26 CA2/6

The Rule of Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara is that a municipal ordinance imposing a tax on video services applies to internet video streaming services when the ordinance uses "channel" in its ordinary meaning as a "programming source" rather than in the technical sense of a "transmission path," under circumstances where the ordinance was approved by voters to modernize and technologically neutralize video service taxation.