California Legal Brief

AI-Generated Practitioner Briefs of California Appellate Opinions

attorney fees

18 opinions tagged “attorney fees”

Marriage of Bowman 4/3/26 CA2/6

The Rule of In re Marriage of Charles and Julie Ann Bowman is that trial courts retain discretion to consider Family Code factors including the losing party's ability to pay when determining the amount of attorney's fees under a prevailing party clause in a marital settlement agreement, under circumstances where the MSA contains a general attorney's fees provision without specific limitations on the court's consideration of equitable factors.

Guinnane Construction Co., Inc. v. Chess 3/26/26 CA1/2

The Rule of Guinnane Construction Co. v. Chess is that the tort of another doctrine does not permit recovery of attorney fees incurred in litigating against the tortfeasor to recover fees awarded as damages, under circumstances where the plaintiff seeks to recover fees spent pursuing the tort action itself rather than fees incurred in third-party litigation necessitated by the tort.

O'Leary v. Jones 3/24/26 CA4/1

The Rule of O'Leary v. Jones is that a party who obtains dismissal of a petition to confirm arbitration award on personal jurisdiction grounds is not a prevailing party under Civil Code section 1717 where the dismissal does not finally resolve the enforceability of the arbitration award and leaves the underlying contract dispute unresolved, under circumstances where the court expressly declines to rule on vacation of the award and the substantive claims may be pursued in another forum.

Clapkin v. Levin 3/16/26 CA2/7

The Rule of Clapkin v. Levin is that a cross-complaint does not arise from protected litigation activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 when the claims are based on the defendant's unprotected business conduct that supplies the elements of liability, even where the cross-complaint references prior litigation for context and evidence, under circumstances where the same dispute would exist absent the litigation activity.

Jacobs v. Papez 3/13/26 CA3

The Rule of Jacobs v. Papez is that an attorney may bring a single declaratory relief action against both the clients and a competing attorney lien claimant to enforce an attorney lien claim on settlement or judgment proceeds, under circumstances where the attorney obtained a recovery for clients and seeks to resolve competing lien claims without having to wait for other attorneys to first establish their liens in separate actions.

Domestic Partnership of Campos & Munoz 3/13/26 CA4/1

The Rule of Torres v. Munoz is that a court abuses its discretion by citing and relying on fictitious case authorities in its order, but a party forfeits the right to challenge such error when the party's own counsel drafted and submitted the order containing the fabricated citations without objecting or alerting the court to the fictitious nature of the authorities, under circumstances where the party had opportunity to verify citations and speak up before the court signed the order.

Moramarco et al. v. Nowakoski 3/5/26 CA4/2

The Rule of Moramarco v. Nowakoski is that a trustee's inability to pay is not a mitigating factor that can reduce a Probate Code section 859 civil penalty for bad faith wrongful taking of trust property, under circumstances where a trustee attorney misappropriated trust funds and the statute provides mandatory double damages.

Physicians for Social etc. v. Dept. of Toxic Substances Control 3/4/26 CA3

The Rule of Physicians for Social Responsibility – Los Angeles v. Department of Toxic Substances Control is that attorney fees cannot be awarded under the catalyst theory where a party has received a final adverse judgment on the merits before the defendant voluntarily provides the relief originally sought, under circumstances where the voluntary action occurs after the lawsuit has been fully litigated to a final judgment against the fee-seeking party.

Woodhouse v. State Bar of Cal. et al. 2/27/26 CA2/8

The Rule of Benjamin Woodhouse v. The State Bar of California et al. is that trial courts have inherent authority to dismiss complaints that assert fantastic, delusional, or fanciful scenarios that have no arguable basis in law or fact, and may declare such plaintiffs vexatious litigants, under circumstances where the complaint presents allegations that no reasonable person would classify as within the realm of possibility.

Haun v. Pagano 2/18/26 CA4/1

The Rule of Haun v. Pagano is that a successful petitioner may recover attorney's fees under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5(a) for prosecution of a financial elder abuse claim even when those fees are inextricably intertwined with defending against a competing elder abuse claim, under the circumstances where the petitioner is seeking fees as a prevailing plaintiff under the unilateral fee-shifting provision rather than as a prevailing defendant under a bilateral fee provision.

Navellier et al. v. Putnam et al. 2/2/26 CA1/5

The Rule of Navellier v. Putnam is that parties to an appeal must promptly notify the appellate court of any bankruptcy filing that "could cause or impose a stay" of proceedings, even if they believe the stay does not apply, under Local Rule 21's mandatory disclosure requirements.

Navellier v. Putnam 2/23/26 CA1/5

The Rule of Navellier v. Putnam is that appellate counsel must promptly notify the court of any party's bankruptcy that could potentially cause a stay under Local Rule 21, regardless of counsel's belief about whether the stay actually applies, under circumstances where the attorney knows about the bankruptcy filing.

Viani v. Fair Oaks Estates, Inc. 1/28/26 CA3

The Rule of Viani v. Fair Oaks Estates, Inc. is that a costs judgment entered after a nonappealable voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not appealable as a final judgment when the appellant seeks to challenge underlying orders rather than the costs determination itself, under circumstances where allowing the appeal would constitute impermissible back-door review of nonappealable orders.

Matthews v. Ryan 1/28/26 CA2/1

The Rule of Maynard Matthews et al. v. Patrick Ryan is that a section 998 settlement offer conditioned on consent by the defendant's insurance carrier is valid, under circumstances where the defendant is defended by an insurer whose consent is necessarily required for any settlement regardless of whether such consent is expressly stated in the offer.

Higginson v. Kia Motors America 1/9/26 CA4/1

The Rule of Higginson is that dismissal of a CLRA claim for failure to file a concurrent venue affidavit must be without prejudice (with leave to amend), not with prejudice, under Civil Code section 1780(d), and that unremedied discovery misuse that deprives a party of material evidence required for trial warrants a new trial and monetary sanctions, under circumstances where a party falsely verifies that responsive documents "never existed" and the court's remedial jury instruction becomes ineffective due to evidentiary exclusions.

Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC 2/17/26 CA4/1

The Rule of Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC is that a motion for attorney fees must be served within 180 days of when a case is voluntarily dismissed pursuant to court order, even when no formal dismissal order is filed until a later date, under circumstances where the case was deemed dismissed by operation of court rules after settlement.

Monroe v. Cal. Public Employees' Retirement System 2/18/26 CA2/2

The Rule of Monroe is that a state employee who service retires while under investigation for misconduct is ineligible for disability retirement benefits because the service retirement constitutes a complete severance of the employer-employee relationship, eliminating the necessary prerequisite for disability retirement—the right to return to service, under circumstances where the employee's departure was not related to a disabling medical condition and occurred during misconduct proceedings.

Marriage of Hoch 2/17/26 CA4/3

The Rule of In re Marriage of Hoch is that a family court abuses its discretion under Family Code section 271 by imposing sanctions against a party for refusing to stipulate to permit the opposing party to amend a petition from legal separation to dissolution of marriage, under circumstances where the refusal is based on conscientiously held religious beliefs and the moving party could have avoided the costs by initially filing a dissolution petition.