California Legal Brief

The Rule of Guinnane Construction Co. v. Chess is that the tort of another doctrine does not permit recovery of attorney fees incurred in litigating against the tortfeasor to recover fees awarded as damages, under circumstances where the plaintiff seeks to recover fees spent pursuing the tort action itself rather than fees incurred in third-party litigation necessitated by the tort.

The Rule of Cleare v. Superior Court is that a school district cannot invoke the impossibility doctrine to excuse non-compliance with statutory teacher credentialing requirements until it has exhausted all available statutory remedies including seeking waivers from the Commission on Teaching Credentialing or State Board of Education, under circumstances where the district uses long-term substitutes beyond statutory limits instead of permanent credentialed teachers.

The Rule of Pechkis v. Trustees of the California State University is that an anti-SLAPP motion to strike entire causes of action fails when the defendant does not identify with specificity how each claim underlying the causes of action arises from protected activity, under circumstances where the causes of action contain both protected and unprotected conduct.

The Rule of Guardian Storage Centers, LLC is that attorneys must comply with State Fund obligations when they receive attorney-client privileged materials that were impermissibly taken from the privilege holder without authorization, even when the materials were originally sent to the disclosing person in their corporate capacity, under circumstances where the person later provides the materials to their attorney in their individual capacity against the privilege holder.

The Rule of Chi v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that a DMV hearing officer does not violate due process by introducing evidence and ruling on objections when acting as a neutral fact-finder rather than as an advocate, under circumstances where the DMV has expressly instructed hearing officers to act impartially and not advocate for the department.

The Rule of City of Fresno is that "great bodily injury" as used in Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(A)(ii) for California Public Records Act disclosure of law enforcement records means "a significant or substantial physical injury" as defined in Penal Code section 12022.7(f)(1), under circumstances where records relate to incidents involving use of force by police officers against persons.

The Rule of Clapkin v. Levin is that a cross-complaint does not arise from protected litigation activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 when the claims are based on the defendant's unprotected business conduct that supplies the elements of liability, even where the cross-complaint references prior litigation for context and evidence, under circumstances where the same dispute would exist absent the litigation activity.

The Rule of Jacobs v. Papez is that an attorney may bring a single declaratory relief action against both the clients and a competing attorney lien claimant to enforce an attorney lien claim on settlement or judgment proceeds, under circumstances where the attorney obtained a recovery for clients and seeks to resolve competing lien claims without having to wait for other attorneys to first establish their liens in separate actions.

The Rule of Torres v. Munoz is that a court abuses its discretion by citing and relying on fictitious case authorities in its order, but a party forfeits the right to challenge such error when the party's own counsel drafted and submitted the order containing the fabricated citations without objecting or alerting the court to the fictitious nature of the authorities, under circumstances where the party had opportunity to verify citations and speak up before the court signed the order.

The Rule of Pagan v. City of San Rafael is that a public entity is entitled to summary judgment on dangerous condition claims when the alleged dangers are open and obvious to users exercising due care, under circumstances where the plaintiff cannot establish liability through expert testimony that relies on unpleaded theories of liability, inadmissible hearsay, speculation without foundation, and legal conclusions about regulatory compliance.

The Rule of Yan v. City of Diamond Bar is that evidence of prior branch failures from the same tree species in the same vicinity is admissible to prove a public entity's actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition, under circumstances where the trees share common characteristics (same species, maintenance schedule, and environmental factors) and the evidence demonstrates a pattern of recurring problems that should attract the entity's attention to a condition requiring correction.

The Rule of Alameda County Taxpayers' Association v. City of Oakland is that specific references in an initiative measure identifying a private corporation as currently filling a role that involves functions and duties violate article II, section 12, but such references can be severed without invalidating the remainder of the measure, under circumstances where the references are grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable and the measure contains a severability clause.

The Rule of John Doe v. Regents of the University of California is that students accused of sexual misconduct in university disciplinary proceedings have no absolute right to cross-examine accusers at a hearing when they have already had a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine those accusers under oath in related criminal proceedings, under circumstances where the university follows its own procedures and the decision-maker has access to sworn testimony transcripts from the criminal case.

The Rule of Nichols v. Alghannam is that treating a patient without valid hospital staff privileges constitutes "professional negligence" subject to the 3-year medical malpractice statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5, under circumstances where the physician provided pain management services within the scope of his license but allegedly violated hospital privilege requirements.

The Rule of Harrington v. Housing Authority of Riverside County is that under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, a trial court conducting independent judgment review must determine whether the agency's factual findings are supported by the evidence, not independently find facts to support the agency's ultimate decision, under circumstances where fundamental vested rights like Section 8 housing assistance are at stake.

The Rule of Benjamin Woodhouse v. The State Bar of California et al. is that trial courts have inherent authority to dismiss complaints that assert fantastic, delusional, or fanciful scenarios that have no arguable basis in law or fact, and may declare such plaintiffs vexatious litigants, under circumstances where the complaint presents allegations that no reasonable person would classify as within the realm of possibility.

The Rule of Fix the City, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles is that a charter city may enact an ordinance establishing a local housing and/or homelessness emergency that confers mayoral powers to address conditions within the city's territory, under circumstances where the ordinance defines different types of emergencies and powers than those provided in the California Emergency Services Act and does not conflict with CESA's coordination and mutual aid framework.

The Rule of Bartholomew v. Parking Concepts is that collecting and maintaining individuals' ALPR information without implementing and making public the statutorily required policy harms these individuals by violating their right to know, under the California Automated License Plate Recognition Law (Civil Code sections 1798.90.5-1798.90.551).

The Rule of Fisher v. Fisher is that intentional infliction of emotional distress can be the legal cause of a wrongful death when the tortious conduct is a substantial factor in causing severe emotional distress that leads to the victim's death, under the broader scope of liability standard applicable to intentional torts rather than the narrower "scope of risk" standard used for negligence.

The Rule of County of Sacramento v. NKS Real Estate Holdings, Inc. is that a county may pursue a nuisance per se action against property owners who construct and lease accessory dwelling units without required building permits, under circumstances where the county has adopted ordinances expressly declaring permit violations to be public nuisances.

The Rule of Jogani v. Jogani is that an expert's undisclosed opinion regarding lost profits cannot be admitted at trial without prior disclosure, under circumstances where the opinion concerns a specific damages calculation ($1.98 billion in alleged lost investment profits) that was never disclosed in discovery.

The Rule of Environmental Health Advocates, Inc. v. Pancho Villa's, Inc. is that Proposition 65's pre-suit notice requirements are given directory effect and substantial compliance is the governing test, under circumstances where technical deviations from specific notice requirements do not undermine the core purposes of enabling prosecuting agencies to assess potential enforcement actions, allowing violators to cure violations, and defining the scope of the private party's right to sue.

The Rule of Haun v. Pagano is that a successful petitioner may recover attorney's fees under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5(a) for prosecution of a financial elder abuse claim even when those fees are inextricably intertwined with defending against a competing elder abuse claim, under the circumstances where the petitioner is seeking fees as a prevailing plaintiff under the unilateral fee-shifting provision rather than as a prevailing defendant under a bilateral fee provision.

The Rule of Nichols v. Alghannam is that the MICRA statute of limitations (Code Civ.

The Rule of Bagby v. Davis is that California law applies to collection actions in California courts regardless of where the judgment debtor lives, and that a voluntarily surrendered life insurance policy is treated as matured (not exempt) unless the proceeds are necessary for the debtor's support, under circumstances where the debtor seeks exemption from levy on accounts funded by surrendered insurance policy proceeds.

The Rule of Diaz v. Thor Motor Coach is that forum selection clauses in motorhome warranties are unenforceable as unconscionable when they are part of warranty agreements containing other illegal provisions that violate California's Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, even when the manufacturer offers to stipulate not to enforce the illegal provisions in the out-of-state forum.

The Rule of Findlay Grant et al. v. Chapman University is that a university's statements about class locations, campus facilities, and "face-to-face contact" requirements do not constitute sufficiently "specific" promises to create an enforceable implied contract for in-person education, under circumstances where the statements are general expectations rather than binding commitments and facilities descriptions contain express disclaimers.

The Rule of Bartholomew v. Parking Concepts, Inc. is that collecting and using license plate information through an automated system without implementing and making publicly available the statutorily required usage and privacy policy constitutes "harm" under the ALPR Law sufficient to state a cause of action, under circumstances where an entity operates cameras and computer algorithms to automatically read and convert license plate images into computer-readable data.

The Rule of Conservatorship of A.B. is that a person may be found presently gravely disabled if clear and convincing evidence shows they lack insight into their mental illness and will not take medication necessary to provide for basic needs without a court order, under circumstances where the evidence demonstrates a longstanding pattern of decompensating when not under mandatory medication orders despite repeated cycles of hospitalization.

The Rule of Navellier v. Putnam is that parties to an appeal must promptly notify the appellate court of any bankruptcy filing that "could cause or impose a stay" of proceedings, even if they believe the stay does not apply, under Local Rule 21's mandatory disclosure requirements.

The Rule of Navellier v. Putnam is that appellate counsel must promptly notify the court of any party's bankruptcy that could potentially cause a stay under Local Rule 21, regardless of counsel's belief about whether the stay actually applies, under circumstances where the attorney knows about the bankruptcy filing.

The Rule of Brown v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that the Department of Motor Vehicles is not required to disclose the identity of a third-party reporter who initiates a driver reexamination proceeding, under circumstances where the reporter's form merely initiates the process but is not relied upon for the ultimate license suspension decision, the driver receives notice and hearing opportunities, and disclosure of the reporter's identity would compromise road safety by deterring future reports.

The Rule of Halperin v. Halperin is that a plaintiff cannot maintain a civil tort claim for intentional interference with expected inheritance (IIEI) when she has an adequate remedy available in probate, under circumstances where the plaintiff has standing in probate and the ability to seek relief based on the same factual allegations underlying the tort claim.

The Rule of Viani v. Fair Oaks Estates, Inc. is that a costs judgment entered after a nonappealable voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not appealable as a final judgment when the appellant seeks to challenge underlying orders rather than the costs determination itself, under circumstances where allowing the appeal would constitute impermissible back-door review of nonappealable orders.

The Rule of Maynard Matthews et al. v. Patrick Ryan is that a section 998 settlement offer conditioned on consent by the defendant's insurance carrier is valid, under circumstances where the defendant is defended by an insurer whose consent is necessarily required for any settlement regardless of whether such consent is expressly stated in the offer.

The Rule of Department of Water Resources v. The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California is that a state agency's definition of a proposed program must be sufficiently definite to ascertain whether it qualifies as a statutory "modification" of an existing authorized project rather than a new unit requiring separate legislative approval, under circumstances where the agency seeks to validate revenue bonds based on broad definitional language that fails to establish clear boundaries or purposes for the proposed facilities.

The Rule of Santa Clara Valley Water District v. Eisenberg is that the claim and delivery law does not preclude a party from seeking preliminary injunctive relief to recover possession of personal property, under Code of Civil Procedure section 516.050, even after the party has already obtained a writ of possession and turnover order under the claim and delivery statutes.

The Rule of Vallejo City Unified School District v. Superior Court is that a school district is immune from liability under Education Code section 44808 for harm to parents caused by a student's off-campus suicide, under circumstances where the student was not and should not have been under the immediate and direct supervision of district employees at the time of death, even if the district was allegedly negligent in its on-campus supervision and response to the student's mental health crisis.

The Rule of De Paolo is that a terminated resident manager whose occupancy was contingent solely upon employment has no right to continue possession after employment termination and is not entitled to Tenant Protection Act protections, under circumstances where the resident manager's agreement explicitly conditioned occupancy on continued employment and required vacation within 30 days of termination.

The Rule of Spring Oaks Capital SPV, LLC v. Fowler is that a party who fails to properly disclose witness names and addresses in response to a Code of Civil Procedure section 96 request cannot call that undisclosed witness at trial, under circumstances where the responding party only provided the witness's role without specific name identification and the requesting party properly objected.

The Rule of Parsonage v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. is that ICRAA authorizes consumers to recover the statutory sum of $10,000 as a remedy for a violation of their statutory rights, without any further showing of concrete injury or adverse employment decision, under circumstances where an employer fails to comply with any requirement of ICRAA's disclosure and consent provisions.

The Rule of Tavares v. Zipcar is that remote rental car companies exempt under Civil Code section 1939.37 owe no duty to assess whether renters appear impaired at the time of rental or to equip vehicles with impairment detection technology, under circumstances where the rental is conducted through a membership agreement allowing remote vehicle access without in-person employee interaction.

The Rule of Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC is that a motion for attorney fees must be served within 180 days of when a case is voluntarily dismissed pursuant to court order, even when no formal dismissal order is filed until a later date, under circumstances where the case was deemed dismissed by operation of court rules after settlement.

The Rule of Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara is that a municipal ordinance imposing a tax on video services applies to internet video streaming services when the ordinance uses "channel" in its ordinary meaning as a "programming source" rather than in the technical sense of a "transmission path," under circumstances where the ordinance was approved by voters to modernize and technologically neutralize video service taxation.

The Rule of Bishop v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Association is that a public employee suffers a "conviction" within the meaning of Government Code section 7522.74 when the employee pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a job-related felony, regardless of whether the court later reduces the offense to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17(b), under circumstances where the employee pleaded guilty to a felony charge before any reduction occurred.

The Rule of Trustees of the California State University is that public employers have a duty to bargain over reasonably foreseeable effects of student vaccination policy changes on immunocompromised faculty health and safety, but implementation must actually begin before an unfair practice violation occurs, under the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (HEERA).

The Rule of Ashirwad, LLC v. Michael S. Bradbury et al. is that Civil Code section 1945's presumption of month-to-month tenancy renewal can be rebutted by objective evidence that parties did not mutually agree to continue the lease, even without proof of a new or different agreement, under circumstances where the parties' objective acts and words demonstrate lack of mutual assent despite payment and acceptance of rent.

The Rule of Semaan v. Mosier is that court-appointed receivers are protected by quasi-judicial immunity for their discretionary acts and decisions made in their capacity as receiver, under circumstances where the receiver must exercise judgment or discretion in performing their judicial functions.

The Rule of Sorokunov v. NetApp is that an arbitration award finding that a plaintiff did not suffer individual Labor Code violations can preclude the same plaintiff from claiming standing as an "aggrieved employee" in a PAGA action based on the identical violations, under circumstances where the plaintiff fully litigated the Labor Code violations in arbitration with a final award against them.

The Rule of Monroe is that a state employee who service retires while under investigation for misconduct is ineligible for disability retirement benefits because the service retirement constitutes a complete severance of the employer-employee relationship, eliminating the necessary prerequisite for disability retirement—the right to return to service, under circumstances where the employee's departure was not related to a disabling medical condition and occurred during misconduct proceedings.

The Rule of Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan is that a contractual exclusion limiting evidence use only applies to valuations "under" the specific regulatory provision cited, and does not preclude use of the same evidence in quantum meruit valuations which are separate and distinct from regulatory determinations, under circumstances where the exclusion clause specifically references only determinations made pursuant to a particular regulation subsection.

The Rule of Clarke v. Yu is that oral or implied joint venture agreements are subject to the statute of frauds if the agreement, by its terms, cannot be performed within a year from its making, under circumstances where the joint venture's purpose involves activities that cannot possibly be completed within one year.

The Rule of Dion v. Weber is that under the Victims of Corporate Fraud Compensation Fund statutory scheme, trial courts are precluded from relitigating the merits of underlying fraud judgments when evaluating payment claims from the fund, under circumstances where the Secretary of State denies payment based on challenges to the validity of the original fraud judgment.

The Rule of City of Riverside v. RLI Insurance Company is that an additional insured has standing to sue both the named insured and the insurer in the same action for breach of contract and bad faith claims, under circumstances where the plaintiff is a first-party additional insured with privity of contract rather than a third-party tort claimant.

The Rule of 360 So Reeves, LLC v. Jeff Dutton is that a lessor's noncompliance with Civil Code section 1962 is an affirmative defense for which the lessee bears the burden of proof, under circumstances where a successor landlord allegedly failed to provide proper notice of change of ownership and service of process information to a residential tenant.

The Rule of The Merchant of Tennis is that when employers obtain individual settlement agreements from putative class members through fraud or misrepresentation, a curative notice must inform those employees that rescinding their agreements to join the class action may require repayment of settlement funds at the conclusion of litigation, under Civil Code sections 1689, 1691, and 1693, even though the trial court retains discretion to adjust equities between the parties at judgment.

The Rule of Melissa I. Aerni et al. v. RR San Dimas, L.P., et al. is that Civil Code section 1940.1 does not require individualized proof that each plaintiff used a residential hotel as their own primary residence, under circumstances where plaintiffs seek class certification for violations of the statute's prohibition against the "28-day shuffle."

The Rule of Department of Water Resources Cases is that a public entity with eminent domain authority may conduct precondemnation entry and testing activities under Code of Civil Procedure section 1245.010 et seq.

The Rule of The Merchant of Tennis is that when putative class members rescind individual settlement agreements obtained through fraud or duress to join a class action lawsuit, they must be notified in the curative notice that they could be responsible for repayment of settlement consideration at the conclusion of litigation pursuant to Civil Code sections 1689, 1691, and 1693, under circumstances where an employer has obtained nearly 1,000 individual settlement agreements from employees during pending class certification proceedings through misrepresentations about the litigation.

The Rule of Albarghouti is that the California False Claims Act creates a 60-day default sealing period, after which the seal lifts automatically absent the government's request for an extension, under circumstances where a qui tam plaintiff files the complaint in camera, serves the Attorney General by certified mail, and the government neither requests a seal extension nor provides notice of its intervention decision within 60 days.