California Legal Brief

The Rule of Armstrong v. Superior Court is that Penal Code section 1000.7 grants probation departments, not trial courts, the authority to determine whether defendants meet statutory criteria for young adult deferred entry of judgment programs, under circumstances where the Legislature has explicitly assigned this determination to the probation department through clear statutory language.

The Rule of In re E.J. is that Penal Code section 29820, which prohibits minors adjudged wards of the juvenile court for specified offenses from possessing firearms until age 30, is facially constitutional under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, under circumstances where the prohibition is based on a prior juvenile adjudication for qualifying criminal conduct.

The Rule of In re Bergstrom is that Penal Code section 292 validly implements California Constitution article I, section 12's bail exception by defining specified sexual offenses against children as involving acts of violence and great bodily harm, under circumstances where the constitutional provision does not itself define these terms and the Legislature has authority to implement this constitutional bail exception.

The Rule of Chi v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that a DMV hearing officer does not violate due process by introducing evidence and ruling on objections when acting as a neutral fact-finder rather than as an advocate, under circumstances where the DMV has expressly instructed hearing officers to act impartially and not advocate for the department.

The Rule of Sheerer v. Panas is that a trial court must include all bonus income and restricted stock units (RSUs) in calculating child support under the uniform statewide guideline formula, under circumstances where a parent receives such variable compensation and the court has not made proper findings to deviate from the presumptively correct guideline amount.

The Rule of In re Marriage of Jenkins is that a default judgment in dissolution proceedings that awards specific property division relief exceeds the relief requested where the dissolution petition listed all property division issues as "To be determined," under circumstances where the defaulted party lacked proper notice of the prove-up hearing and the specific property division being sought.

The Rule of Torres v. Munoz is that a court abuses its discretion by citing and relying on fictitious case authorities in its order, but a party forfeits the right to challenge such error when the party's own counsel drafted and submitted the order containing the fabricated citations without objecting or alerting the court to the fictitious nature of the authorities, under circumstances where the party had opportunity to verify citations and speak up before the court signed the order.

The Rule of John Doe v. Regents of the University of California is that students accused of sexual misconduct in university disciplinary proceedings have no absolute right to cross-examine accusers at a hearing when they have already had a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine those accusers under oath in related criminal proceedings, under circumstances where the university follows its own procedures and the decision-maker has access to sworn testimony transcripts from the criminal case.

The Rule of Harrington v. Housing Authority of Riverside County is that under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, a trial court conducting independent judgment review must determine whether the agency's factual findings are supported by the evidence, not independently find facts to support the agency's ultimate decision, under circumstances where fundamental vested rights like Section 8 housing assistance are at stake.

The Rule of J.S. v. D.A. is that indigent inmates in bona fide civil actions that threaten their interests have a right to meaningful access to the courts to be heard in their defense, and trial courts must address and rule on such requests before proceeding without the inmate, under circumstances where an incarcerated defendant requests court assistance to participate in proceedings and the court has notice of the incarceration.

The Rule of The People v. T.B. is that "no less onerous alternatives" in Penal Code section 2679(b) refers to medical alternatives to the proposed organic therapy, not to alternative procedural methods of obtaining consent, under circumstances where an inmate patient lacks capacity to consent to electroconvulsive therapy and the court must authorize nonconsensual ECT.

The Rule of *People v. Alston* is that under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, a trial court must expressly explain its reasons on the record when ruling on an objection to a peremptory challenge, including making findings on whether presumptively invalid reasons were rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, under circumstances where the prosecutor's stated reasons for the challenge include distrust of law enforcement by a prospective juror who is a member of a cognizable group.

The Rule of People v. Heaps is that ex parte communications with a deliberating jury concerning a juror's ability to deliberate require reversal unless the prosecution proves harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, under circumstances where the trial court fails to notify counsel of the jury's note raising competency concerns and the record does not establish how the jury resolved those concerns.

The Rule of Brown v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that the Department of Motor Vehicles is not required to disclose the identity of a third-party reporter who initiates a driver reexamination proceeding, under circumstances where the reporter's form merely initiates the process but is not relied upon for the ultimate license suspension decision, the driver receives notice and hearing opportunities, and disclosure of the reporter's identity would compromise road safety by deterring future reports.

The Rule of People v. Aguilar is that a prosecutor's peremptory challenge based on alleged "juror confusion" is presumptively invalid under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1)(C), and requires the trial court to confirm that the asserted confused behavior actually occurred based on the court's own observations, under circumstances where the prospective juror is perceived as a member of a protected group and gives clear, consistent answers regarding the legal concept in question.

The Rule of In re Lynex is that to obtain appointed counsel under the California Racial Justice Act, an indigent habeas petitioner need only plead a "plausible allegation" of a violation of Penal Code section 745(a), which is an "extremely low" and "minimal pleading requirement" that does not require a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, under circumstances where the petitioner seeks counsel to prosecute racial bias claims in criminal proceedings.

The Rule of Anaheim Police Department v. Crockett is that a gun violence restraining order may be issued against a firearm owner who fails to adequately secure weapons from a prohibited person who poses a credible threat of violence, under circumstances where the firearm owner enables access to weapons by someone with a documented mental health history and lifetime firearms prohibition who has made specific threats of mass violence.

The Rule of People v. Superior Court of Riverside County (Lashelle) is that the failure to file a misdemeanor complaint within the 25-day period specified in Penal Code section 853.6 does not deprive the government of the right to demand a cited person's presence in court and does not render the individual "automatically freed from any restraint," under circumstances where the defendant signed a written promise to appear and remains subject to statutory consequences for non-appearance including criminal prosecution, fines, and arrest.

The Rule of Gerard v. Cuevas is that a trial court cannot retroactively shorten a notice period under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987 to 91 minutes and then impose a terminating sanction when the defendant fails to appear, under circumstances where the original notice was untimely served and the court had not previously ordered shortened time.

The Rule of People v. Gutierrez is that a Governor's state of emergency proclamation is subject to independent legal interpretation by courts, not jury determination, and when a proclamation limits emergency zones to specific "high hazard areas" to be identified by state agencies rather than declaring a statewide emergency, the prosecution must prove the crime occurred within those specifically identified areas, under circumstances where the proclamation's plain language directs agencies to identify particular zones rather than declaring the emergency exists throughout the entire state.

The Rule of Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara is that a municipal ordinance imposing a tax on video services applies to internet video streaming services when the ordinance uses "channel" in its ordinary meaning as a "programming source" rather than in the technical sense of a "transmission path," under circumstances where the ordinance was approved by voters to modernize and technologically neutralize video service taxation.

The Rule of Bishop v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Association is that a public employee suffers a "conviction" within the meaning of Government Code section 7522.74 when the employee pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a job-related felony, regardless of whether the court later reduces the offense to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17(b), under circumstances where the employee pleaded guilty to a felony charge before any reduction occurred.

The Rule of In re L.G. is that substantial evidence must support a juvenile court's finding that there are no reasonable means to protect a child without removal, and the Bureau must make reasonable efforts to prevent removal before a child can be taken from parental custody, under circumstances where a parent has mental health issues but the Bureau has not explored alternative interventions like family maintenance plans or evaluated available support persons.

The Rule of People v. Perez is that impoundment of a legally parked vehicle solely to prevent future unlawful driving by an unlicensed driver does not satisfy the Fourth Amendment's community caretaking function, under circumstances where the vehicle poses no present danger to public safety or traffic flow.

The Rule of Department of Water Resources Cases is that a public entity with eminent domain authority may conduct precondemnation entry and testing activities under Code of Civil Procedure section 1245.010 et seq.