California Legal Brief

The Rule of In re Marriage of Capos is that a family law order establishing child support arrears is not void for lack of due process when the requesting party clearly stated the relief sought in supporting documentation attached to the formal request, under circumstances where the opposing party received actual notice and filed a substantive response on the merits.

The Rule of People v. Chhuon and Pan is that defense counsel cannot concede a defendant's guilt to any crime over the defendant's express objection to maintain innocence, even as part of an alternative argument strategy, under circumstances where the defendant expressly instructs counsel not to admit guilt and counsel nevertheless argues the defendant is guilty of lesser charges to avoid the death penalty.

The Rule of J.O. v. Superior Court is that if a party timely objects to a Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 motion and makes a prima facie showing that the motion's proponent is lodging bad faith blanket challenges against a judge, a court may look beyond the section 170.6 affidavit or oral statement and inquire into the legitimacy of the party's assertions of prejudice, under circumstances where bad faith blanket abuses of section 170.6 materially impair the judiciary's constitutional function to effectively administer justice.

The Rule of Greely v. Greely is that a judgment creditor cannot use the spousal exception under Code of Civil Procedure section 700.160(b)(2) to levy on deposit accounts held in the name of a bigamous spouse without a court order, because a bigamous marriage is void ab initio and the supporting spousal affidavit is therefore false, under circumstances where the marriage was bigamous at inception regardless of whether it has been formally annulled.

The Rule of People v. Mitchell is that defendants who agreed to upper term sentences as part of plea bargains may seek retroactive application of Penal Code section 1170(b)'s amended jury trial requirements to their nonfinal judgments, under circumstances where the defendant did not validly waive the later-created statutory rights at the time of the original plea.

The Rule of In re K.L. is that DCFS satisfies its ICWA initial inquiry duty when it contacts parents and reasonably available extended family members, even if some extended family members remain unreachable despite good faith efforts, under circumstances where the agency attempted contact, obtained disconnected phone numbers, and family members declined to provide contact information without the missing person's consent.

The Rule of Hiller v. Marin Municipal Water District is that challenges to water rate ordinances must be brought through validation proceedings within 120 days of adoption, and failure to participate in a water district's validation action bars all subsequent constitutional and substantive challenges to the rates, under Government Code section 53759's mandatory validation statute requirements.

The Rule of People v. Moss is that a trial court may reimpose an upper term sentence during Penal Code section 1172.75 resentencing without additional jury findings or defendant stipulation to aggravating factors, under circumstances where the defendant was originally sentenced to an upper term.

The Rule of In re Kowalczyk is that trial courts may only deny bail in noncapital cases for offenses specified in California Constitution article I, section 12, subdivisions (b) and (c), and when setting monetary bail, must generally set it in an amount that is reasonably attainable for the defendant based on an individualized assessment of the totality of circumstances, under circumstances where pretrial detention is not warranted under section 12 subdivisions (b) or (c).

The Rule of People v. Stayner is that a defendant's statement "I prefer not to talk now" during a Miranda advisement does not constitute an unambiguous invocation of Miranda rights when the defendant subsequently agrees to be interviewed at a different location, under circumstances where the defendant was told he was not under arrest, voluntarily agreed to travel with FBI agents, and later voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and signed a waiver form before making any incriminating statements.

The Rule of People v. Mohammed is that trial courts lack inherent jurisdiction to correct unauthorized sentences once judgment is final and execution has begun, under circumstances where the defendant has not timely appealed and the court acts solely based on the unauthorized sentence rule.

The Rule of In re Z.G. is that a juvenile court may not terminate parental rights merely by finding a likelihood of adoption but must also make one of the additional findings referenced in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), under circumstances where a parent has not received statutorily guaranteed reunification services and was not properly bypassed for such services.

The Rule of People v. Emrick is that probation conditions cannot delegate excessive judicial authority to probation departments to determine the nature of sanctions and cannot deny custody credits for time in residential treatment without a knowing and voluntary waiver, under circumstances where conditions give probation officers open-ended discretion to jail probationers based on unilateral determinations of treatment non-completion.

The Rule of People v. Hardy is that assault weapons, short-barreled shotguns, large capacity magazines, and silencers are not protected "arms" under the Second Amendment, and regulations requiring firearm transfers through licensed dealers do not meaningfully constrain the right to keep and bear arms, under circumstances where defendants mount facial constitutional challenges to California's firearms restrictions.

The Rule of People v. Bertsch and Hronis is that a defendant's extreme religious beliefs alone do not render him mentally incompetent under Penal Code section 1367 if he is unwilling, rather than unable, to cooperate with counsel, under circumstances where the defendant understands the proceedings and can rationally assist in his defense despite his religious convictions.

The Rule of People v. C.F. is that trial counsel renders ineffective assistance when failing to request a no-cost court reporter for a hearing on involuntary antipsychotic medication, under circumstances where the hearing provides the sole evidentiary basis for the court's order and the failure to secure a reporter is tantamount to waiver of the right to appeal.

The Rule of Chi v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that a DMV hearing officer's combination of investigative and adjudicatory functions does not violate due process when the officer acts as a neutral fact-finder rather than as an advocate for the department, under circumstances where the officer introduces relevant evidence, asks clarifying questions, and rules on objections pursuant to a policy requiring neutrality.

The Rule of Tulare Medical Center Property Owners Association is that CC&Rs adopted by public entities prohibiting abortion clinics are unenforceable as violations of fundamental public policy and Civil Code section 531, under circumstances where a public entity creates land use restrictions that interfere with constitutional reproductive rights without demonstrating a compelling governmental interest.

The Rule of People v. Deen is that a trial court must conduct an objective evaluation of whether a prospective juror's circumstances would prevent or substantially interfere with their ability to act with entire impartiality, even when the juror states they can be fair, under circumstances where a panelist has personal relationships with victims or witnesses, has received detailed case information from prospective witnesses, and expresses concerns about their ability to be impartial.

The Rule of In re Marriage of Jenkins is that a default judgment in a family law case must be set aside when it exceeds the relief requested in the petition and the defaulting party lacked adequate notice of the specific assets to be divided, under circumstances where the petition contained only "TBD" placeholders for property division and the prove-up hearing was conducted based on informal, off-the-record communications without proper notice to the defaulting spouse.

The Rule of Armstrong v. Superior Court is that Penal Code section 1000.7 grants probation departments, not trial courts, the authority to determine whether defendants meet statutory criteria for young adult deferred entry of judgment programs, under circumstances where the Legislature has explicitly assigned this determination to the probation department through clear statutory language.

The Rule of In re E.J. is that Penal Code section 29820, which prohibits minors adjudged wards of the juvenile court for specified offenses from possessing firearms until age 30, is facially constitutional under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, under circumstances where the prohibition is based on a prior juvenile adjudication for qualifying criminal conduct.

The Rule of In re Bergstrom is that Penal Code section 292 validly implements California Constitution article I, section 12's bail exception by defining specified sexual offenses against children as involving acts of violence and great bodily harm, under circumstances where the constitutional provision does not itself define these terms and the Legislature has authority to implement this constitutional bail exception.

The Rule of Chi v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that a DMV hearing officer does not violate due process by introducing evidence and ruling on objections when acting as a neutral fact-finder rather than as an advocate, under circumstances where the DMV has expressly instructed hearing officers to act impartially and not advocate for the department.

The Rule of NNN Capital Fund I, LLC v. Mikles is that lack of standing is a jurisdictional defect that can be raised for the first time on appeal and requires vacation of an arbitration award and remand for factual determination of standing, under circumstances where purported liquidating trustees may not have been properly elected under the company's operating agreement.

The Rule of Sheerer v. Panas is that a trial court must include all bonus income and restricted stock units (RSUs) in calculating child support under the uniform statewide guideline formula, under circumstances where a parent receives such variable compensation and the court has not made proper findings to deviate from the presumptively correct guideline amount.

The Rule of In re Marriage of Jenkins is that a default judgment in dissolution proceedings that awards specific property division relief exceeds the relief requested where the dissolution petition listed all property division issues as "To be determined," under circumstances where the defaulted party lacked proper notice of the prove-up hearing and the specific property division being sought.

The Rule of Torres v. Munoz is that a court abuses its discretion by citing and relying on fictitious case authorities in its order, but a party forfeits the right to challenge such error when the party's own counsel drafted and submitted the order containing the fabricated citations without objecting or alerting the court to the fictitious nature of the authorities, under circumstances where the party had opportunity to verify citations and speak up before the court signed the order.

The Rule of John Doe v. Regents of the University of California is that students accused of sexual misconduct in university disciplinary proceedings have no absolute right to cross-examine accusers at a hearing when they have already had a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine those accusers under oath in related criminal proceedings, under circumstances where the university follows its own procedures and the decision-maker has access to sworn testimony transcripts from the criminal case.

The Rule of Harrington v. Housing Authority of Riverside County is that under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, a trial court conducting independent judgment review must determine whether the agency's factual findings are supported by the evidence, not independently find facts to support the agency's ultimate decision, under circumstances where fundamental vested rights like Section 8 housing assistance are at stake.

The Rule of J.S. v. D.A. is that indigent inmates in bona fide civil actions that threaten their interests have a right to meaningful access to the courts to be heard in their defense, and trial courts must address and rule on such requests before proceeding without the inmate, under circumstances where an incarcerated defendant requests court assistance to participate in proceedings and the court has notice of the incarceration.

The Rule of The People v. T.B. is that "no less onerous alternatives" in Penal Code section 2679(b) refers to medical alternatives to the proposed organic therapy, not to alternative procedural methods of obtaining consent, under circumstances where an inmate patient lacks capacity to consent to electroconvulsive therapy and the court must authorize nonconsensual ECT.

The Rule of *People v. Alston* is that under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, a trial court must expressly explain its reasons on the record when ruling on an objection to a peremptory challenge, including making findings on whether presumptively invalid reasons were rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, under circumstances where the prosecutor's stated reasons for the challenge include distrust of law enforcement by a prospective juror who is a member of a cognizable group.

The Rule of People v. Heaps is that ex parte communications with a deliberating jury concerning a juror's ability to deliberate require reversal unless the prosecution proves harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, under circumstances where the trial court fails to notify counsel of the jury's note raising competency concerns and the record does not establish how the jury resolved those concerns.

The Rule of Brown v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that the Department of Motor Vehicles is not required to disclose the identity of a third-party reporter who initiates a driver reexamination proceeding, under circumstances where the reporter's form merely initiates the process but is not relied upon for the ultimate license suspension decision, the driver receives notice and hearing opportunities, and disclosure of the reporter's identity would compromise road safety by deterring future reports.

The Rule of People v. Aguilar is that a prosecutor's peremptory challenge based on alleged "juror confusion" is presumptively invalid under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1)(C), and requires the trial court to confirm that the asserted confused behavior actually occurred based on the court's own observations, under circumstances where the prospective juror is perceived as a member of a protected group and gives clear, consistent answers regarding the legal concept in question.

The Rule of In re Lynex is that to obtain appointed counsel under the California Racial Justice Act, an indigent habeas petitioner need only plead a "plausible allegation" of a violation of Penal Code section 745(a), which is an "extremely low" and "minimal pleading requirement" that does not require a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, under circumstances where the petitioner seeks counsel to prosecute racial bias claims in criminal proceedings.

The Rule of Anaheim Police Department v. Crockett is that a gun violence restraining order may be issued against a firearm owner who fails to adequately secure weapons from a prohibited person who poses a credible threat of violence, under circumstances where the firearm owner enables access to weapons by someone with a documented mental health history and lifetime firearms prohibition who has made specific threats of mass violence.

The Rule of People v. Superior Court of Riverside County (Lashelle) is that the failure to file a misdemeanor complaint within the 25-day period specified in Penal Code section 853.6 does not deprive the government of the right to demand a cited person's presence in court and does not render the individual "automatically freed from any restraint," under circumstances where the defendant signed a written promise to appear and remains subject to statutory consequences for non-appearance including criminal prosecution, fines, and arrest.

The Rule of Gerard v. Cuevas is that a trial court cannot retroactively shorten a notice period under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987 to 91 minutes and then impose a terminating sanction when the defendant fails to appear, under circumstances where the original notice was untimely served and the court had not previously ordered shortened time.

The Rule of People v. Gutierrez is that a Governor's state of emergency proclamation is subject to independent legal interpretation by courts, not jury determination, and when a proclamation limits emergency zones to specific "high hazard areas" to be identified by state agencies rather than declaring a statewide emergency, the prosecution must prove the crime occurred within those specifically identified areas, under circumstances where the proclamation's plain language directs agencies to identify particular zones rather than declaring the emergency exists throughout the entire state.

The Rule of Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara is that a municipal ordinance imposing a tax on video services applies to internet video streaming services when the ordinance uses "channel" in its ordinary meaning as a "programming source" rather than in the technical sense of a "transmission path," under circumstances where the ordinance was approved by voters to modernize and technologically neutralize video service taxation.

The Rule of Bishop v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Association is that a public employee suffers a "conviction" within the meaning of Government Code section 7522.74 when the employee pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a job-related felony, regardless of whether the court later reduces the offense to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17(b), under circumstances where the employee pleaded guilty to a felony charge before any reduction occurred.

The Rule of In re L.G. is that substantial evidence must support a juvenile court's finding that there are no reasonable means to protect a child without removal, and the Bureau must make reasonable efforts to prevent removal before a child can be taken from parental custody, under circumstances where a parent has mental health issues but the Bureau has not explored alternative interventions like family maintenance plans or evaluated available support persons.

The Rule of People v. Perez is that impoundment of a legally parked vehicle solely to prevent future unlawful driving by an unlicensed driver does not satisfy the Fourth Amendment's community caretaking function, under circumstances where the vehicle poses no present danger to public safety or traffic flow.

The Rule of Department of Water Resources Cases is that a public entity with eminent domain authority may conduct precondemnation entry and testing activities under Code of Civil Procedure section 1245.010 et seq.

The Rule of People v. Espiritu is that when a trial court fails to make a meaningful inquiry into whether proffered reasons for exercising peremptory challenges fall into presumptively invalid categories under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, the defendant's initial objection under the statute preserves appellate review of that procedural failure, under circumstances where defense counsel objected to a peremptory challenge but did not specifically identify the potential presumptive invalidity below.

The Rule of People v. Harzan is that a trial court prejudicially violates a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense when it conditions the exclusion of highly prejudicial prior misconduct evidence on the defendant's waiver of an entrapment defense, under circumstances where the prior misconduct evidence is not relevant to the objective entrapment standard under California law.

The Rule of People v. Molina is that different sex offender registration requirements for defendants convicted under Penal Code section 288(c)(1) versus section 288(a) do not violate equal protection where there is a rational basis for the disparity, under rational basis review where lifetime registration for section 288(c)(1) offenders (who must be at least 24 years old with a 10-year age gap) can be rationally distinguished from tier two registration for section 288(a) offenders.

The Rule of People v. Wayne Hansen Hsiung is that a defendant charged with specific intent crimes such as trespass with intent to interfere with business and conspiracy must be permitted to present evidence of his good faith mistake of law defense based on his belief that necessity doctrine justified his conduct, even when the necessity defense itself is legally unavailable, under circumstances where legal experts advised the defendant that his trespass was lawful under necessity principles.

The Rule of In re Marriage of LaShelle and Nicholas Capos is that a judgment awarding child support arrears is not void for lack of due process when the requesting party clearly states the relief sought in supporting documents and the opposing party files a responsive pleading addressing the merits, under circumstances where boxes relating to child support on judicial council forms are not checked but the specific relief is nonetheless plainly articulated in accompanying declarations.

The Rule of Harland v. City of West Hollywood is that a plaintiff cannot cure a premature filing violation of the Government Claims Act by voluntarily dismissing and refiling an identical lawsuit, even when the public entity later denies the claim, under circumstances where the plaintiff filed suit before the required 45-day waiting period elapsed and the original complaint was served before any corrective amended complaint.

The Rule of People v. Hayes is that when police use coercive tactics including chemical gas, flash-bangs, and robotic devices to force a suspect to exit their residence, the arrest occurs inside the home and requires a valid warrant, under circumstances where the suspect submitted to police authority while still inside by complying with orders to come out.