California Legal Brief

The Rule of Sargenti v. City of Long Beach is that a public entity lacks constructive notice of a dangerous condition when the only evidence of the condition's duration is an unauthenticated Google Street View screenshot, and serving amended interrogatory responses that correct factual errors does not automatically create a triable issue of material fact on summary judgment, under circumstances where the moving party corrects inadvertent errors in discovery responses and the opposing party fails to provide admissible evidence disputing the corrections or authenticating photographic evidence.

The Rule of Cardenas v. Los Angeles Unified School District is that appellate arguments are forfeited when the opening brief cites only to trial court briefing that itself contains no record citations, under circumstances where the appellate brief fails to provide direct citations to record evidence supporting factual assertions.

The Rule of People v. Stayner is that a defendant's statement "I prefer not to talk now" during a Miranda advisement does not constitute an unambiguous invocation of Miranda rights when the defendant subsequently agrees to be interviewed at a different location, under circumstances where the defendant was told he was not under arrest, voluntarily agreed to travel with FBI agents, and later voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and signed a waiver form before making any incriminating statements.

The Rule of Myers v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that body-worn camera video evidence showing an officer failed to continuously observe a DUI suspect for 15 minutes before administering a chemical breath test successfully rebuts the Evidence Code section 664 presumption of compliance with Title 17 regulations, under circumstances where the video objectively demonstrates the officer left the suspect alone in a patrol car with doors closed during the observation period.

The Rule of Nargizyan is that an insurer cannot establish application of a "continuous or repeated seepage or leakage" policy exclusion based solely on the size of a pinhole leak and resulting water damage, without evidence of the actual duration of the leak, under circumstances where the insured discovered and immediately repaired the leak with no evidence of mold or long-term water accumulation.

The Rule of People v. Player is that a jury's not-true finding on a personal firearm use enhancement does not preclude a resentencing court from finding the defendant was the actual killer in a Penal Code section 1172.6 proceeding, under circumstances where the jury convicted the defendant of murder despite the not-true weapon enhancement finding.

The Rule of In re Melson is that the prosecution must correct false testimony from key eyewitnesses regarding what they previously told police during their identification process, even if the false statements appear to result from faulty memory rather than intentional perjury, under circumstances where the prosecutor knew or should have known the testimony was false based on available police interview transcripts and the false testimony could have contributed to the verdict.

The Rule of Chi v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that a DMV hearing officer does not violate due process by introducing evidence and ruling on objections when acting as a neutral fact-finder rather than as an advocate, under circumstances where the DMV has expressly instructed hearing officers to act impartially and not advocate for the department.

The Rule of People v. Tzul is that a defendant's handwritten note found at a crime scene stating he found victims "having sex" and that this "fills me with rage" is admissible as circumstantial evidence of the defendant's state of mind for provocation defense, under circumstances where the statement about what defendant observed is not hearsay when offered to show defendant's belief rather than truth of the observation, and the statement about defendant's emotional reaction is admissible hearsay under Evidence Code section 1250's state-of-mind exception.

The Rule of People v. Tzul is that a handwritten statement found at a crime scene expressing the defendant's rage and belief about what victims were doing has significant probative value for provocation defense that cannot be substantially outweighed by prejudice concerns under Evidence Code section 352, under circumstances where the statement is the only evidence of provocation and is central to the defense theory.

The Rule of Scott Meiner v. The Superior Court of Orange County is that an Apple Pay account constitutes a "financial account" for purposes of probation search limitations and must be excluded from warrantless probation searches when the probation terms expressly exclude "financial accounts," under circumstances where the probation terms specifically limit search authorization and do not extend to financial accounts.

The Rule of People v. Jones is that a defendant confined in jail in one county cannot willfully fail to appear for sentencing in another county, and the prosecution must prove a willful failure to appear with admissible evidence including certified court records, under circumstances where a defendant enters a Cruz waiver plea agreement.

The Rule of People v. Anderson is that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to CalECPA violations, permitting admission of electronic device evidence when law enforcement reasonably believed they had valid consent from an authorized possessor, under circumstances where a deceased person's next of kin consents to search the decedent's phone and no other person has a stronger claim to possession.

The Rule of Torres v. Munoz is that a court abuses its discretion by citing and relying on fictitious case authorities in its order, but a party forfeits the right to challenge such error when the party's own counsel drafted and submitted the order containing the fabricated citations without objecting or alerting the court to the fictitious nature of the authorities, under circumstances where the party had opportunity to verify citations and speak up before the court signed the order.

The Rule of Pagan v. City of San Rafael is that a public entity is entitled to summary judgment on dangerous condition claims when the alleged dangers are open and obvious to users exercising due care, under circumstances where the plaintiff cannot establish liability through expert testimony that relies on unpleaded theories of liability, inadmissible hearsay, speculation without foundation, and legal conclusions about regulatory compliance.

The Rule of Yan v. City of Diamond Bar is that evidence of prior branch failures from the same tree species in the same vicinity is admissible to prove a public entity's actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition, under circumstances where the trees share common characteristics (same species, maintenance schedule, and environmental factors) and the evidence demonstrates a pattern of recurring problems that should attract the entity's attention to a condition requiring correction.

The Rule of Bartholomew v. Parking Concepts is that collecting and maintaining individuals' ALPR information without implementing and making public the statutorily required policy harms these individuals by violating their right to know, under the California Automated License Plate Recognition Law (Civil Code sections 1798.90.5-1798.90.551).

The Rule of Jogani v. Jogani is that an expert's undisclosed opinion regarding lost profits cannot be admitted at trial without prior disclosure, under circumstances where the opinion concerns a specific damages calculation ($1.98 billion in alleged lost investment profits) that was never disclosed in discovery.

The Rule of *People v. Alston* is that under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, a trial court must expressly explain its reasons on the record when ruling on an objection to a peremptory challenge, including making findings on whether presumptively invalid reasons were rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, under circumstances where the prosecutor's stated reasons for the challenge include distrust of law enforcement by a prospective juror who is a member of a cognizable group.

The Rule of People v. Dixon is that grand jury proceeding transcripts and police reports containing witness statements are inadmissible at Penal Code section 1172.6 evidentiary hearings, under circumstances where the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and the documents constitute multiple levels of hearsay without applicable exceptions.

The Rule of The People v. Zapata is that when a suspect invokes and does not waive the right to counsel, and a known law enforcement officer continues to "stimulate" a Perkins operation in a manner that amounts to a custodial interrogation, the suspect's resulting incriminating statements are inadmissible, under circumstances where the known officer's actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response and created a police-dominated atmosphere of compulsion.

The Rule of Esparza v. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County is that incompetence to testify under Evidence Code section 701 may not be presumed from a prior grave disability finding under the LPS Act, under circumstances where a conservatorship has been established based on inability to provide for basic personal needs.

The Rule of People v. Aguilar is that a prosecutor's peremptory challenge based on alleged "juror confusion" is presumptively invalid under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1)(C), and requires the trial court to confirm that the asserted confused behavior actually occurred based on the court's own observations, under circumstances where the prospective juror is perceived as a member of a protected group and gives clear, consistent answers regarding the legal concept in question.

The Rule of People v. Dixon is that grand jury proceeding transcripts are not admissible under Penal Code section 1172.6(d)(3)'s hearsay exception for evidence previously admitted at a prior hearing or trial, under circumstances where the Legislature used specific statutory language referring to "hearings" and "trials" while grand jury proceedings are designated as "proceedings" or "sessions" in the statutory scheme and lack adversarial safeguards.

The Rule of Microsoft Corporation v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County is that a trial court may issue a nondisclosure order prohibiting an electronic service provider from notifying its enterprise customer of a search warrant's existence, under circumstances where the court has reviewed a sealed affidavit and found that disclosure could cause adverse results enumerated in CalECPA, even when the provider proposes to notify only a "trusted contact" at the customer organization who is not the target of the investigation.

The Rule of Spring Oaks Capital SPV, LLC v. Fowler is that a party who fails to properly disclose witness names and addresses in response to a Code of Civil Procedure section 96 request cannot call that undisclosed witness at trial, under circumstances where the responding party only provided the witness's role without specific name identification and the requesting party properly objected.

The Rule of Chapman v. Avon Products is that expert testimony about asbestos testing methodology is admissible when the witness demonstrates sufficient knowledge, skill, experience, or training to interpret test results relevant to their field of expertise, under circumstances where the expert relies on established scientific principles even if using older or modified techniques.

The Rule of Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan is that a contractual exclusion limiting evidence use only applies to valuations "under" the specific regulatory provision cited, and does not preclude use of the same evidence in quantum meruit valuations which are separate and distinct from regulatory determinations, under circumstances where the exclusion clause specifically references only determinations made pursuant to a particular regulation subsection.

The Rule of Meiner is that Apple Pay accounts constitute "financial accounts" under probation search terms that exclude such accounts from warrantless searches, under circumstances where the probation conditions explicitly exclude "financial accounts" from the search authorization and the Apple Pay account is licensed as a money transmitter and regulated by financial authorities.

The Rule of People v. Harzan is that a trial court prejudicially violates a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense when it conditions the exclusion of highly prejudicial prior misconduct evidence on the defendant's waiver of an entrapment defense, under circumstances where the prior misconduct evidence is not relevant to the objective entrapment standard under California law.

The Rule of Paknad v. Superior Court is that when an employer defends against an employee's discrimination lawsuit by asserting an avoidable consequences defense based on the scope and adequacy of its internal investigation, the employer waives attorney-client privilege and work product protection as to all factual findings about the employee's allegations and information relevant to the investigation's scope and adequacy, under circumstances where the employer voluntarily put the investigation's thoroughness and independence at issue in its pleadings and discovery responses.

The Rule of Detrick v. Shimada is that a non-English speaking witness's declaration is inadmissible without foundational evidence of a qualified interpreter and attestation that the translation accurately reflects the witness's words, under circumstances where the witness cannot read, write, or speak English and provides no evidence of interpreter qualifications or translation accuracy.

The Rule of People v. Pineda is that at section 1172.6 resentencing evidentiary hearings, previously admitted hearsay testimony from preliminary hearings is admissible if it meets a current hearsay exception, including the declaration against interest exception when the statements subjected the declarant to risk of criminal liability.

The Rule of People v. Superior Court (Feghhi) is that an officer's failure to inform a magistrate in a search warrant application that a DUI defendant requested a breath test does not undermine the validity of the warrant authorizing seizure of a blood sample, under circumstances where the warrant was otherwise supported by probable cause based on objective signs of intoxication and the defendant's involvement in a fatal DUI crash.