California Legal Brief

The Rule of Independent Office of Law Enforcement Review and Outreach v. Sonoma County Sheriff's Office is that Government Code section 25303.7 grants mandatory subpoena power to all sheriff oversight entities established by counties, under circumstances where the county has elected to create such an oversight entity within the meaning of the statute.

The Rule of Cleare v. Superior Court is that a school district cannot invoke the impossibility doctrine to excuse non-compliance with statutory teacher credentialing requirements until it has exhausted all available statutory remedies including seeking waivers from the Commission on Teaching Credentialing or State Board of Education, under circumstances where the district uses long-term substitutes beyond statutory limits instead of permanent credentialed teachers.

The Rule of West Contra Costa Unified School District is that a school district cannot claim impossibility as a defense to statutory teacher certification requirements until it has exhausted all statutory alternatives, including seeking waivers from the Commission on Teaching Credentialing or the State Board of Education, under circumstances where the district uses rolling substitutes instead of qualified permanent teachers in violation of statutory mandates.

The Rule of Pechkis v. Trustees of the California State University is that an anti-SLAPP motion to strike entire causes of action fails when the defendant does not identify with specificity how each claim underlying the causes of action arises from protected activity, under circumstances where the causes of action contain both protected and unprotected conduct.

The Rule of Chi v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that a DMV hearing officer does not violate due process by introducing evidence and ruling on objections when acting as a neutral fact-finder rather than as an advocate, under circumstances where the DMV has expressly instructed hearing officers to act impartially and not advocate for the department.

The Rule of City of Fresno is that "great bodily injury" as used in Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(A)(ii) for California Public Records Act disclosure of law enforcement records means "a significant or substantial physical injury" as defined in Penal Code section 12022.7(f)(1), under circumstances where records relate to incidents involving use of force by police officers against persons.

The Rule of Pagan v. City of San Rafael is that a public entity is entitled to summary judgment on dangerous condition claims when the alleged dangers are open and obvious to users exercising due care, under circumstances where the plaintiff cannot establish liability through expert testimony that relies on unpleaded theories of liability, inadmissible hearsay, speculation without foundation, and legal conclusions about regulatory compliance.

The Rule of Yan v. City of Diamond Bar is that evidence of prior branch failures from the same tree species in the same vicinity is admissible to prove a public entity's actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition, under circumstances where the trees share common characteristics (same species, maintenance schedule, and environmental factors) and the evidence demonstrates a pattern of recurring problems that should attract the entity's attention to a condition requiring correction.

The Rule of Physicians for Social Responsibility – Los Angeles v. Department of Toxic Substances Control is that attorney fees cannot be awarded under the catalyst theory where a party has received a final adverse judgment on the merits before the defendant voluntarily provides the relief originally sought, under circumstances where the voluntary action occurs after the lawsuit has been fully litigated to a final judgment against the fee-seeking party.

The Rule of Harrington v. Housing Authority of Riverside County is that under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, a trial court conducting independent judgment review must determine whether the agency's factual findings are supported by the evidence, not independently find facts to support the agency's ultimate decision, under circumstances where fundamental vested rights like Section 8 housing assistance are at stake.

The Rule of Fix the City, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles is that a charter city may enact an ordinance establishing a local housing and/or homelessness emergency that confers mayoral powers to address conditions within the city's territory, under circumstances where the ordinance defines different types of emergencies and powers than those provided in the California Emergency Services Act and does not conflict with CESA's coordination and mutual aid framework.

The Rule of County of Sacramento v. NKS Real Estate Holdings, Inc. is that a county may pursue a nuisance per se action against property owners who construct and lease accessory dwelling units without required building permits, under circumstances where the county has adopted ordinances expressly declaring permit violations to be public nuisances.

The Rule of Committee for Tiburon LLC v. Town of Tiburon is that a program EIR for a local agency's general plan need not include site-specific environmental analysis of sites identified in the housing element where no housing project has been proposed for the site, under circumstances where the absence of project-specific details precludes informed review of environmental impacts and mitigation measures.

The Rule of Brown v. Department of Motor Vehicles is that the Department of Motor Vehicles is not required to disclose the identity of a third-party reporter who initiates a driver reexamination proceeding, under circumstances where the reporter's form merely initiates the process but is not relied upon for the ultimate license suspension decision, the driver receives notice and hearing opportunities, and disclosure of the reporter's identity would compromise road safety by deterring future reports.

The Rule of Department of Water Resources v. The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California is that a state agency's definition of a proposed program must be sufficiently definite to ascertain whether it qualifies as a statutory "modification" of an existing authorized project rather than a new unit requiring separate legislative approval, under circumstances where the agency seeks to validate revenue bonds based on broad definitional language that fails to establish clear boundaries or purposes for the proposed facilities.

The Rule of Zenith Insurance Company v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board is that equitable tolling of the 60-day deadline under former Labor Code section 5909 cannot justify the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board's 20-month delay in issuing a decision on reconsideration after granting a petition for "further study," under circumstances where the Board failed to demonstrate reasonable and good faith conduct in attempting to comply with statutory procedures.

The Rule of Microsoft Corporation v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County is that a trial court may issue a nondisclosure order prohibiting an electronic service provider from notifying its enterprise customer of a search warrant's existence, under circumstances where the court has reviewed a sealed affidavit and found that disclosure could cause adverse results enumerated in CalECPA, even when the provider proposes to notify only a "trusted contact" at the customer organization who is not the target of the investigation.

The Rule of Bishop v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Association is that a public employee suffers a "conviction" within the meaning of Government Code section 7522.74 when the employee pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a job-related felony, regardless of whether the court later reduces the offense to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17(b), under circumstances where the employee pleaded guilty to a felony charge before any reduction occurred.

The Rule of Monroe is that a state employee who service retires while under investigation for misconduct is ineligible for disability retirement benefits because the service retirement constitutes a complete severance of the employer-employee relationship, eliminating the necessary prerequisite for disability retirement—the right to return to service, under circumstances where the employee's departure was not related to a disabling medical condition and occurred during misconduct proceedings.

The Rule of Dion v. Weber is that under the Victims of Corporate Fraud Compensation Fund statutory scheme, trial courts are precluded from relitigating the merits of underlying fraud judgments when evaluating payment claims from the fund, under circumstances where the Secretary of State denies payment based on challenges to the validity of the original fraud judgment.

The Rule of Department of Water Resources Cases is that a public entity with eminent domain authority may conduct precondemnation entry and testing activities under Code of Civil Procedure section 1245.010 et seq.

The Rule of Albarghouti is that the California False Claims Act creates a 60-day default sealing period, after which the seal lifts automatically absent the government's request for an extension, under circumstances where a qui tam plaintiff files the complaint in camera, serves the Attorney General by certified mail, and the government neither requests a seal extension nor provides notice of its intervention decision within 60 days.