California Legal Brief

AI-Generated Practitioner Briefs of California Appellate Opinions

consumer protection

12 opinions tagged “consumer protection”

J.M. v. Illuminate Education, Inc. 5/14/26 SC

The Rule of J.M. v. Illuminate Education, Inc. is that an educational technology company that collects and stores student medical information to help school districts assess educational needs is not a "provider of health care" under the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA), and students are not "customers" under the Customer Records Act (CRA), under circumstances where the company provides services to school districts rather than directly to individuals for medical diagnosis/treatment or personal health record management.

Chemical Toxin Working Grp. v. Kroger Co. 4/29/26 CA2/3

The Rule of The Chemical Toxin Working Group is that Proposition 65's 60-day pre-suit notice substantially complies with regulatory requirements when it provides the name and contact information of the noticing entity's outside counsel rather than a responsible individual within the noticing entity, under circumstances where the notice otherwise identifies the alleged violation with sufficient specificity to enable prosecuting agencies to assess the claim and allow violators to cure violations.

Western Manufactured Housing Cmty. Assn. v. City of Santa Rosa 4/17/26 CA1/4

The Rule of Western Manufactured Housing Communities Association v. City of Santa Rosa is that during a declared state of emergency, Penal Code section 396's definition of "rental price" for rent-controlled mobilehome spaces occupied at the time of the emergency declaration refers to the rental amount authorized under the local rent control ordinance at the time of the emergency declaration, not at any given time thereafter, and mobilehome park owners cannot "recoup" suppressed rent increases by using those increases as a baseline for post-emergency rent calculations, under circumstances where rent-controlled mobilehome spaces are subject to both local rent control ordinances and section 396's 10-percent cumulative cap during a multi-year emergency declaration.

Aerni v. RR San Dimas, L.P. 4/15/26

The Rule of Aerni is that section 1940.1 does not require individualized proof that each class member used the hotel as their primary residence; rather, whether a hotel is "residential" is a hotel-wide inquiry based on the character and intended/actual use of the hotel as a whole, under circumstances where plaintiffs seek class certification for claims alleging the "28-day shuffle" practice at residential hotels.

Bartholomew v. Parking Concepts, Inc. 2/27/26 CA1/5

The Rule of Bartholomew v. Parking Concepts is that collecting and maintaining individuals' ALPR information without implementing and making public the statutorily required policy harms these individuals by violating their right to know, under the California Automated License Plate Recognition Law (Civil Code sections 1798.90.5-1798.90.551).

Environmental Health Advocates, Inc. v. Pancho Villa's, Inc. 2/20/26 CA4/1

The Rule of Environmental Health Advocates, Inc. v. Pancho Villa's, Inc. is that Proposition 65's pre-suit notice requirements are given directory effect and substantial compliance is the governing test, under circumstances where technical deviations from specific notice requirements do not undermine the core purposes of enabling prosecuting agencies to assess potential enforcement actions, allowing violators to cure violations, and defining the scope of the private party's right to sue.

Diaz v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. 2/13/26 CA2/8

The Rule of Diaz v. Thor Motor Coach is that forum selection clauses in motorhome warranties are unenforceable as unconscionable when they are part of warranty agreements containing other illegal provisions that violate California's Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, even when the manufacturer offers to stipulate not to enforce the illegal provisions in the out-of-state forum.

Bartholomew v. Parking Concepts, Inc. 2/5/26 CA1/5

The Rule of Bartholomew v. Parking Concepts, Inc. is that collecting and using license plate information through an automated system without implementing and making publicly available the statutorily required usage and privacy policy constitutes "harm" under the ALPR Law sufficient to state a cause of action, under circumstances where an entity operates cameras and computer algorithms to automatically read and convert license plate images into computer-readable data.

Higginson v. Kia Motors America 1/9/26 CA4/1

The Rule of Higginson is that dismissal of a CLRA claim for failure to file a concurrent venue affidavit must be without prejudice (with leave to amend), not with prejudice, under Civil Code section 1780(d), and that unremedied discovery misuse that deprives a party of material evidence required for trial warrants a new trial and monetary sanctions, under circumstances where a party falsely verifies that responsive documents "never existed" and the court's remedial jury instruction becomes ineffective due to evidentiary exclusions.

Spring Oaks Capital SPV, LLC v. Fowler 12/8/25 Santa Clara/AD

The Rule of Spring Oaks Capital SPV, LLC v. Fowler is that a party who fails to properly disclose witness names and addresses in response to a Code of Civil Procedure section 96 request cannot call that undisclosed witness at trial, under circumstances where the responding party only provided the witness's role without specific name identification and the requesting party properly objected.

Parsonage v. Wal-Mart Associates 2/4/26 CA4/1

The Rule of Parsonage v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. is that ICRAA authorizes consumers to recover the statutory sum of $10,000 as a remedy for a violation of their statutory rights, without any further showing of concrete injury or adverse employment decision, under circumstances where an employer fails to comply with any requirement of ICRAA's disclosure and consent provisions.

Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC 2/17/26 CA4/1

The Rule of Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC is that a motion for attorney fees must be served within 180 days of when a case is voluntarily dismissed pursuant to court order, even when no formal dismissal order is filed until a later date, under circumstances where the case was deemed dismissed by operation of court rules after settlement.