California Legal Brief

The Rule of People ex rel. Yolo-Solano Air Quality Management District v. Spencer Defty is that a cross-complaint challenging the validity of an internal agency policy does not arise from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute when the regulatory enforcement actions are merely evidence of the policy's application rather than the basis for liability, under circumstances where the cross-complaint seeks declaratory relief that the policy was adopted without proper rulemaking procedures.

The Rule of Waterford Property Company v. County of Orange is that a declaratory relief action challenging governmental tax assessments arises from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute when the claim relies upon the government entity's public statements, advocacy, petitioning activities, and official communications regarding the tax assessments, under circumstances where the plaintiff frames the dispute as involving broader public policy issues and relies on the government's protected speech to establish both the existence of an actual controversy and the need for declaratory relief.

The Rule of Pechkis v. Trustees of the California State University is that an anti-SLAPP motion to strike entire causes of action fails when the defendant does not identify with specificity how each claim underlying the causes of action arises from protected activity, under circumstances where the causes of action contain both protected and unprotected conduct.

The Rule of Clapkin v. Levin is that a cross-complaint does not arise from protected litigation activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 when the claims are based on the defendant's unprotected business conduct that supplies the elements of liability, even where the cross-complaint references prior litigation for context and evidence, under circumstances where the same dispute would exist absent the litigation activity.

The Rule of Semaan v. Mosier is that a court-appointed receiver is protected by quasi-judicial immunity for the receiver's discretionary acts and decisions made in their capacity as receiver, under circumstances where the receiver must exercise discretionary judgment in fulfilling court orders.

The Rule of Semaan v. Mosier is that court-appointed receivers are protected by quasi-judicial immunity for their discretionary acts and decisions made in their capacity as receiver, under circumstances where the receiver must exercise judgment or discretion in performing their judicial functions.

The Rule of Zand v. Sukumar is that an appellant cannot use the doctrine of voidness to collaterally attack a final appellate judgment by claiming trial court orders were void, when the challenged orders rest on errors that are merely in excess of jurisdiction rather than fundamental jurisdictional defects, under circumstances where the appellant has already appealed the underlying orders and lost.