California Legal Brief

The Rule of Colonial Manor, Inc. v. Vilma Reyes is that a surviving spouse who occupied a rent-controlled unit as a lawful occupant with the landlord's knowledge becomes an at-will tenant by implied agreement upon the original tenant's death and remains protected by local rent control ordinances, under circumstances where the spouse lived in the unit for at least one year before marriage, the landlord was aware of the occupancy, and no sublease agreement existed between the spouses.

The Rule of Western Manufactured Housing Communities Association v. City of Santa Rosa is that during a declared state of emergency, Penal Code section 396's definition of "rental price" for rent-controlled mobilehome spaces occupied at the time of the emergency declaration refers to the rental amount authorized under the local rent control ordinance at the time of the emergency declaration, not at any given time thereafter, and mobilehome park owners cannot "recoup" suppressed rent increases by using those increases as a baseline for post-emergency rent calculations, under circumstances where rent-controlled mobilehome spaces are subject to both local rent control ordinances and section 396's 10-percent cumulative cap during a multi-year emergency declaration.

The Rule of Aerni is that section 1940.1 does not require individualized proof that each class member used the hotel as their primary residence; rather, whether a hotel is "residential" is a hotel-wide inquiry based on the character and intended/actual use of the hotel as a whole, under circumstances where plaintiffs seek class certification for claims alleging the "28-day shuffle" practice at residential hotels.

The Rule of Harrington v. Housing Authority of Riverside County is that under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, a trial court conducting independent judgment review must determine whether the agency's factual findings are supported by the evidence, not independently find facts to support the agency's ultimate decision, under circumstances where fundamental vested rights like Section 8 housing assistance are at stake.

The Rule of De Paolo is that a terminated resident manager whose occupancy was contingent solely upon employment has no right to continue possession after employment termination and is not entitled to Tenant Protection Act protections, under circumstances where the resident manager's agreement explicitly conditioned occupancy on continued employment and required vacation within 30 days of termination.

The Rule of Gerard v. Cuevas is that a trial court cannot retroactively shorten a notice period under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987 to 91 minutes and then impose a terminating sanction when the defendant fails to appear, under circumstances where the original notice was untimely served and the court had not previously ordered shortened time.

The Rule of Ashirwad, LLC v. Michael S. Bradbury et al. is that Civil Code section 1945's presumption of month-to-month tenancy renewal can be rebutted by objective evidence that parties did not mutually agree to continue the lease, even without proof of a new or different agreement, under circumstances where the parties' objective acts and words demonstrate lack of mutual assent despite payment and acceptance of rent.

The Rule of 360 So Reeves, LLC v. Jeff Dutton is that a lessor's noncompliance with Civil Code section 1962 is an affirmative defense for which the lessee bears the burden of proof, under circumstances where a successor landlord allegedly failed to provide proper notice of change of ownership and service of process information to a residential tenant.

The Rule of Melissa I. Aerni et al. v. RR San Dimas, L.P., et al. is that Civil Code section 1940.1 does not require individualized proof that each plaintiff used a residential hotel as their own primary residence, under circumstances where plaintiffs seek class certification for violations of the statute's prohibition against the "28-day shuffle."

The Rule of Apartment Association of Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles is that a municipal ordinance creating a monetary threshold that must be satisfied before a cause of action for unlawful detainer accrues is a permissible substantive regulation of the grounds for eviction rather than an impermissible procedural limitation on the unlawful detainer statutes, under circumstances where the ordinance does not extend the unlawful detainer timeline, does not prohibit landlords from proceeding under the state statutory timeline, and does not require landlords to take affirmative action before commencing unlawful detainer proceedings.