California Legal Brief

The Rule of Guinnane Construction Co. v. Chess is that the tort of another doctrine does not permit recovery of attorney fees incurred in litigating against the tortfeasor to recover fees awarded as damages, under circumstances where the plaintiff seeks to recover fees spent pursuing the tort action itself rather than fees incurred in third-party litigation necessitated by the tort.

The Rule of Clapkin v. Levin is that a cross-complaint does not arise from protected litigation activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 when the claims are based on the defendant's unprotected business conduct that supplies the elements of liability, even where the cross-complaint references prior litigation for context and evidence, under circumstances where the same dispute would exist absent the litigation activity.

The Rule of Bartholomew v. Parking Concepts is that collecting and maintaining individuals' ALPR information without implementing and making public the statutorily required policy harms these individuals by violating their right to know, under the California Automated License Plate Recognition Law (Civil Code sections 1798.90.5-1798.90.551).

The Rule of Jogani v. Jogani is that an expert's undisclosed opinion regarding lost profits cannot be admitted at trial without prior disclosure, under circumstances where the opinion concerns a specific damages calculation ($1.98 billion in alleged lost investment profits) that was never disclosed in discovery.

The Rule of Haun v. Pagano is that a successful petitioner may recover attorney's fees under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5(a) for prosecution of a financial elder abuse claim even when those fees are inextricably intertwined with defending against a competing elder abuse claim, under the circumstances where the petitioner is seeking fees as a prevailing plaintiff under the unilateral fee-shifting provision rather than as a prevailing defendant under a bilateral fee provision.

The Rule of Diaz v. Thor Motor Coach is that forum selection clauses in motorhome warranties are unenforceable as unconscionable when they are part of warranty agreements containing other illegal provisions that violate California's Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, even when the manufacturer offers to stipulate not to enforce the illegal provisions in the out-of-state forum.

The Rule of Findlay Grant et al. v. Chapman University is that a university's statements about class locations, campus facilities, and "face-to-face contact" requirements do not constitute sufficiently "specific" promises to create an enforceable implied contract for in-person education, under circumstances where the statements are general expectations rather than binding commitments and facilities descriptions contain express disclaimers.

The Rule of Navellier v. Putnam is that parties to an appeal must promptly notify the appellate court of any bankruptcy filing that "could cause or impose a stay" of proceedings, even if they believe the stay does not apply, under Local Rule 21's mandatory disclosure requirements.

The Rule of Navellier v. Putnam is that appellate counsel must promptly notify the court of any party's bankruptcy that could potentially cause a stay under Local Rule 21, regardless of counsel's belief about whether the stay actually applies, under circumstances where the attorney knows about the bankruptcy filing.

The Rule of Viani v. Fair Oaks Estates, Inc. is that a costs judgment entered after a nonappealable voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not appealable as a final judgment when the appellant seeks to challenge underlying orders rather than the costs determination itself, under circumstances where allowing the appeal would constitute impermissible back-door review of nonappealable orders.

The Rule of De Paolo is that a terminated resident manager whose occupancy was contingent solely upon employment has no right to continue possession after employment termination and is not entitled to Tenant Protection Act protections, under circumstances where the resident manager's agreement explicitly conditioned occupancy on continued employment and required vacation within 30 days of termination.

The Rule of Spring Oaks Capital SPV, LLC v. Fowler is that a party who fails to properly disclose witness names and addresses in response to a Code of Civil Procedure section 96 request cannot call that undisclosed witness at trial, under circumstances where the responding party only provided the witness's role without specific name identification and the requesting party properly objected.

The Rule of Ashirwad, LLC v. Michael S. Bradbury et al. is that Civil Code section 1945's presumption of month-to-month tenancy renewal can be rebutted by objective evidence that parties did not mutually agree to continue the lease, even without proof of a new or different agreement, under circumstances where the parties' objective acts and words demonstrate lack of mutual assent despite payment and acceptance of rent.

The Rule of Semaan v. Mosier is that court-appointed receivers are protected by quasi-judicial immunity for their discretionary acts and decisions made in their capacity as receiver, under circumstances where the receiver must exercise judgment or discretion in performing their judicial functions.

The Rule of Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan is that a contractual exclusion limiting evidence use only applies to valuations "under" the specific regulatory provision cited, and does not preclude use of the same evidence in quantum meruit valuations which are separate and distinct from regulatory determinations, under circumstances where the exclusion clause specifically references only determinations made pursuant to a particular regulation subsection.

The Rule of Clarke v. Yu is that oral or implied joint venture agreements are subject to the statute of frauds if the agreement, by its terms, cannot be performed within a year from its making, under circumstances where the joint venture's purpose involves activities that cannot possibly be completed within one year.

The Rule of City of Riverside v. RLI Insurance Company is that an additional insured has standing to sue both the named insured and the insurer in the same action for breach of contract and bad faith claims, under circumstances where the plaintiff is a first-party additional insured with privity of contract rather than a third-party tort claimant.

The Rule of The Merchant of Tennis is that when employers obtain individual settlement agreements from putative class members through fraud or misrepresentation, a curative notice must inform those employees that rescinding their agreements to join the class action may require repayment of settlement funds at the conclusion of litigation, under Civil Code sections 1689, 1691, and 1693, even though the trial court retains discretion to adjust equities between the parties at judgment.