California Legal Brief

The Rule of Sargenti v. City of Long Beach is that a public entity lacks constructive notice of a dangerous condition when the only evidence of the condition's duration is an unauthenticated Google Street View screenshot, and serving amended interrogatory responses that correct factual errors does not automatically create a triable issue of material fact on summary judgment, under circumstances where the moving party corrects inadvertent errors in discovery responses and the opposing party fails to provide admissible evidence disputing the corrections or authenticating photographic evidence.

The Rule of Citizens Against Marketplace Apartment/Condo Development v. City of San Ramon is that a city does not abuse its discretion in approving an infill housing development despite general plan language encouraging preparation of a "master plan," under circumstances where the general plan uses discretionary language ("encourage") rather than mandatory requirements and the project achieves the substantive objectives of circulation, access, and visibility improvements while introducing mixed-use residential development.

The Rule of Shear Development Co. v. California Coastal Commission is that courts must exercise independent judgment in determining an agency's appellate jurisdiction when that jurisdiction depends primarily on interpretation of enacted law rather than factual matters, and where two agencies offer conflicting interpretations of a law both administer, no deference is due to either when the Yamaha factors do not clearly favor one interpretation, under circumstances where jurisdictional disputes turn on legal interpretation of local coastal programs and multiple agencies share administrative responsibility.

The Rule of Shear Development Co. v. California Coastal Commission is that courts must exercise independent judgment when reviewing an agency's jurisdictional determinations based on legal interpretation of enacted law, and when two agencies offer conflicting interpretations of law they both administer, neither receives deference if Yamaha factors do not clearly favor one over the other, under circumstances where the jurisdictional question depends primarily on statutory or LCP interpretation rather than factual disputes.

The Rule of Colonial Manor, Inc. v. Vilma Reyes is that a surviving spouse who occupied a rent-controlled unit as a lawful occupant with the landlord's knowledge becomes an at-will tenant by implied agreement upon the original tenant's death and remains protected by local rent control ordinances, under circumstances where the spouse lived in the unit for at least one year before marriage, the landlord was aware of the occupancy, and no sublease agreement existed between the spouses.

The Rule of Western Manufactured Housing Communities Association v. City of Santa Rosa is that during a declared state of emergency, Penal Code section 396's definition of "rental price" for rent-controlled mobilehome spaces occupied at the time of the emergency declaration refers to the rental amount authorized under the local rent control ordinance at the time of the emergency declaration, not at any given time thereafter, and mobilehome park owners cannot "recoup" suppressed rent increases by using those increases as a baseline for post-emergency rent calculations, under circumstances where rent-controlled mobilehome spaces are subject to both local rent control ordinances and section 396's 10-percent cumulative cap during a multi-year emergency declaration.

The Rule of The Retail Property Trust is that Revenue and Taxation Code section 170(a)(1) requires physical damage to property (whether direct or indirect) to qualify for reassessment relief, under circumstances where a property owner seeks disaster relief based on diminished property value from access restrictions alone without any physical harm to property.

The Rule of Waterford Property Company v. County of Orange is that a declaratory relief action challenging governmental tax assessments arises from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute when the claim relies upon the government entity's public statements, advocacy, petitioning activities, and official communications regarding the tax assessments, under circumstances where the plaintiff frames the dispute as involving broader public policy issues and relies on the government's protected speech to establish both the existence of an actual controversy and the need for declaratory relief.

The Rule of Tulare Medical Center Property Owners Association is that CC&Rs adopted by public entities prohibiting abortion clinics are unenforceable as violations of fundamental public policy and Civil Code section 531, under circumstances where a public entity creates land use restrictions that interfere with constitutional reproductive rights without demonstrating a compelling governmental interest.

The Rule of Guinnane Construction Co. v. Chess is that the tort of another doctrine does not permit recovery of attorney fees incurred in litigating against the tortfeasor to recover fees awarded as damages, under circumstances where the plaintiff seeks to recover fees spent pursuing the tort action itself rather than fees incurred in third-party litigation necessitated by the tort.

The Rule of Aerni is that section 1940.1 does not require individualized proof that each class member used the hotel as their primary residence; rather, whether a hotel is "residential" is a hotel-wide inquiry based on the character and intended/actual use of the hotel as a whole, under circumstances where plaintiffs seek class certification for claims alleging the "28-day shuffle" practice at residential hotels.

The Rule of NNN Capital Fund I, LLC v. Mikles is that lack of standing is a jurisdictional defect that can be raised for the first time on appeal and requires vacation of an arbitration award and remand for factual determination of standing, under circumstances where purported liquidating trustees may not have been properly elected under the company's operating agreement.

The Rule of Pagan v. City of San Rafael is that a public entity is entitled to summary judgment on dangerous condition claims when the alleged dangers are open and obvious to users exercising due care, under circumstances where the plaintiff cannot establish liability through expert testimony that relies on unpleaded theories of liability, inadmissible hearsay, speculation without foundation, and legal conclusions about regulatory compliance.

The Rule of Las Posas Valley Water Rights Coalition v. Ventura County Waterworks District No. 1 is that in a comprehensive groundwater adjudication, trial courts may allocate water rights directly to overlying landowners rather than to mutual water companies when the companies act as agents/trustees exercising rights on behalf of shareholders and the landowners retain their underlying overlying water rights, under circumstances where substantial evidence shows the landowners never severed their water rights through written transfer and the companies do not assert exclusive rights against their shareholders.

The Rule of Fix the City, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles is that a charter city may enact an ordinance establishing a local housing and/or homelessness emergency that confers mayoral powers to address conditions within the city's territory, under circumstances where the ordinance defines different types of emergencies and powers than those provided in the California Emergency Services Act and does not conflict with CESA's coordination and mutual aid framework.

The Rule of County of Sacramento v. NKS Real Estate Holdings, Inc. is that a county may pursue a nuisance per se action against property owners who construct and lease accessory dwelling units without required building permits, under circumstances where the county has adopted ordinances expressly declaring permit violations to be public nuisances.

The Rule of Jogani v. Jogani is that an expert's undisclosed opinion regarding lost profits cannot be admitted at trial without prior disclosure, under circumstances where the opinion concerns a specific damages calculation ($1.98 billion in alleged lost investment profits) that was never disclosed in discovery.

The Rule of Committee for Tiburon LLC v. Town of Tiburon is that a program EIR for a local agency's general plan need not include site-specific environmental analysis of sites identified in the housing element where no housing project has been proposed for the site, under circumstances where the absence of project-specific details precludes informed review of environmental impacts and mitigation measures.

The Rule of De Paolo is that a terminated resident manager whose occupancy was contingent solely upon employment has no right to continue possession after employment termination and is not entitled to Tenant Protection Act protections, under circumstances where the resident manager's agreement explicitly conditioned occupancy on continued employment and required vacation within 30 days of termination.

The Rule of Ashirwad, LLC v. Michael S. Bradbury et al. is that Civil Code section 1945's presumption of month-to-month tenancy renewal can be rebutted by objective evidence that parties did not mutually agree to continue the lease, even without proof of a new or different agreement, under circumstances where the parties' objective acts and words demonstrate lack of mutual assent despite payment and acceptance of rent.

The Rule of Montecito Country Club, LLC v. Kevin C. Root is that an easement holder can acquire prescriptive rights to expand the scope of their recorded easement through open, notorious, continuous, and adverse use for five years, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, when the easement holder has maintained boundary landscaping within the easement area for decades without the landowner's permission or interference.

The Rule of Melissa I. Aerni et al. v. RR San Dimas, L.P., et al. is that Civil Code section 1940.1 does not require individualized proof that each plaintiff used a residential hotel as their own primary residence, under circumstances where plaintiffs seek class certification for violations of the statute's prohibition against the "28-day shuffle."

The Rule of Department of Water Resources Cases is that a public entity with eminent domain authority may conduct precondemnation entry and testing activities under Code of Civil Procedure section 1245.010 et seq.

The Rule of Department of Water Resources Cases is that Water Code section 250 and 11580 project authorization and funding requirements do not apply to precondemnation entry and testing activities under Code of Civil Procedure section 1245.010, under circumstances where a public entity with eminent domain authority seeks temporary access to conduct investigations to determine property suitability for future condemnation.

The Rule of Tulare Medical Center Property Owners Association v. Leopoldo Valdivia is that a public entity's adoption and recording of CC&Rs containing a prohibition on abortion clinics violates the California Constitution and is unenforceable as against fundamental public policy, under circumstances where the public entity's creation of the prohibition constitutes government action that interferes with the fundamental right of procreative choice without a compelling justification.

The Rule of Apartment Association of Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles is that a municipal ordinance creating a monetary threshold that must be satisfied before a cause of action for unlawful detainer accrues is a permissible substantive regulation of the grounds for eviction rather than an impermissible procedural limitation on the unlawful detainer statutes, under circumstances where the ordinance does not extend the unlawful detainer timeline, does not prohibit landlords from proceeding under the state statutory timeline, and does not require landlords to take affirmative action before commencing unlawful detainer proceedings.