California Legal Brief

The Rule of In re Tung Trust is that a trust provision stating that any person who fails to survive the settlor for thirty days "shall be considered to have predeceased the settlor" does not constitute a "contrary intention" under Probate Code section 21110(b) to override the antilapse statute, under circumstances where the provision merely establishes a definitional timeline for when someone is deemed to have predeceased the settlor rather than expressly conditioning gifts on survival.

The Rule of J.O. v. Superior Court is that if a party timely objects to a Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 motion and makes a prima facie showing that the motion's proponent is lodging bad faith blanket challenges against a judge, a court may look beyond the section 170.6 affidavit or oral statement and inquire into the legitimacy of the party's assertions of prejudice, under circumstances where bad faith blanket abuses of section 170.6 materially impair the judiciary's constitutional function to effectively administer justice.

The Rule of In re Sebastian C. is that placement in a family home with supervision and programming provided by a community-based agency can meet the requirements of a less restrictive program, under circumstances where the community-based nonresidential service program provides the programming and services rather than just the family home itself.

The Rule of Moramarco v. Nowakoski is that a trustee's inability to pay is not a mitigating factor that can reduce a Probate Code section 859 civil penalty for bad faith wrongful taking of trust property, under circumstances where a trustee attorney misappropriated trust funds and the statute provides mandatory double damages.

The Rule of Fisher v. Fisher is that intentional infliction of emotional distress can be the legal cause of a wrongful death when the tortious conduct is a substantial factor in causing severe emotional distress that leads to the victim's death, under the broader scope of liability standard applicable to intentional torts rather than the narrower "scope of risk" standard used for negligence.

The Rule of Haun v. Pagano is that a successful petitioner may recover attorney's fees under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5(a) for prosecution of a financial elder abuse claim even when those fees are inextricably intertwined with defending against a competing elder abuse claim, under the circumstances where the petitioner is seeking fees as a prevailing plaintiff under the unilateral fee-shifting provision rather than as a prevailing defendant under a bilateral fee provision.

The Rule of Halperin v. Halperin is that a plaintiff cannot maintain a civil tort claim for intentional interference with expected inheritance (IIEI) when she has an adequate remedy available in probate, under circumstances where the plaintiff has standing in probate and the ability to seek relief based on the same factual allegations underlying the tort claim.

The Rule of Conservatorship of B.K. is that an LPS Act conservatee may waive their jury trial right through counsel without a personal on-the-record advisement when the conservatee acknowledges awareness of the right and confirms the waiver choice, under circumstances where counsel has consulted with the conservatee, there is no suggestion counsel lacks authority or disregards the client's wishes, and the conservatee participates in the proceedings without objection.

The Rule of Conservatorship of R.R. is that a conservatorship initiated pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5361 begins upon "the appointment of the conservator by the superior court" on the date the court issues its reappointment order, not retroactively to the date of the prior conservatorship's automatic termination, under circumstances where conservatorship proceedings have not been completed by the automatic termination date and the court has ordered the conservatee held until proceedings are completed.