California Legal Brief

The Rule of Parsonage v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. is that ICRAA authorizes consumers to recover the statutory sum of $10,000 as a remedy for a violation of their statutory rights, without any further showing of concrete injury or adverse employment decision, under circumstances where an employer fails to comply with any requirement of ICRAA's disclosure and consent provisions.

The Rule of Tavares v. Zipcar is that remote rental car companies exempt under Civil Code section 1939.37 owe no duty to assess whether renters appear impaired at the time of rental or to equip vehicles with impairment detection technology, under circumstances where the rental is conducted through a membership agreement allowing remote vehicle access without in-person employee interaction.

The Rule of Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC is that a motion for attorney fees must be served within 180 days of when a case is voluntarily dismissed pursuant to court order, even when no formal dismissal order is filed until a later date, under circumstances where the case was deemed dismissed by operation of court rules after settlement.

The Rule of People v. Gutierrez is that a Governor's state of emergency proclamation is subject to independent legal interpretation by courts, not jury determination, and when a proclamation limits emergency zones to specific "high hazard areas" to be identified by state agencies rather than declaring a statewide emergency, the prosecution must prove the crime occurred within those specifically identified areas, under circumstances where the proclamation's plain language directs agencies to identify particular zones rather than declaring the emergency exists throughout the entire state.

The Rule of Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara is that a municipal ordinance imposing a tax on video services applies to internet video streaming services when the ordinance uses "channel" in its ordinary meaning as a "programming source" rather than in the technical sense of a "transmission path," under circumstances where the ordinance was approved by voters to modernize and technologically neutralize video service taxation.

The Rule of Bishop v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Association is that a public employee suffers a "conviction" within the meaning of Government Code section 7522.74 when the employee pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a job-related felony, regardless of whether the court later reduces the offense to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17(b), under circumstances where the employee pleaded guilty to a felony charge before any reduction occurred.

The Rule of Trustees of the California State University is that public employers have a duty to bargain over reasonably foreseeable effects of student vaccination policy changes on immunocompromised faculty health and safety, but implementation must actually begin before an unfair practice violation occurs, under the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (HEERA).

The Rule of Ashirwad, LLC v. Michael S. Bradbury et al. is that Civil Code section 1945's presumption of month-to-month tenancy renewal can be rebutted by objective evidence that parties did not mutually agree to continue the lease, even without proof of a new or different agreement, under circumstances where the parties' objective acts and words demonstrate lack of mutual assent despite payment and acceptance of rent.

The Rule of Semaan v. Mosier is that court-appointed receivers are protected by quasi-judicial immunity for their discretionary acts and decisions made in their capacity as receiver, under circumstances where the receiver must exercise judgment or discretion in performing their judicial functions.

The Rule of Sorokunov v. NetApp is that an arbitration award finding that a plaintiff did not suffer individual Labor Code violations can preclude the same plaintiff from claiming standing as an "aggrieved employee" in a PAGA action based on the identical violations, under circumstances where the plaintiff fully litigated the Labor Code violations in arbitration with a final award against them.

The Rule of Chapman v. Avon Products is that expert testimony about asbestos testing methodology is admissible when the witness demonstrates sufficient knowledge, skill, experience, or training to interpret test results relevant to their field of expertise, under circumstances where the expert relies on established scientific principles even if using older or modified techniques.

The Rule of In re L.G. is that substantial evidence must support a juvenile court's finding that there are no reasonable means to protect a child without removal, and the Bureau must make reasonable efforts to prevent removal before a child can be taken from parental custody, under circumstances where a parent has mental health issues but the Bureau has not explored alternative interventions like family maintenance plans or evaluated available support persons.

The Rule of Montecito Country Club, LLC v. Kevin C. Root is that an easement holder can acquire prescriptive rights to expand the scope of their recorded easement through open, notorious, continuous, and adverse use for five years, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, when the easement holder has maintained boundary landscaping within the easement area for decades without the landowner's permission or interference.

The Rule of Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission is that a public utilities commission's quasi-legislative decision developing a successor net energy metering tariff pursuant to statutory directive receives narrow judicial review and will be upheld if it lies within the lawmaking authority delegated by the Legislature and is reasonably necessary to implement the statutory purpose, under circumstances where the Legislature has explicitly directed the commission to develop a tariff meeting specified objectives while providing discretion to revise the tariff as appropriate.

The Rule of Monroe is that a state employee who service retires while under investigation for misconduct is ineligible for disability retirement benefits because the service retirement constitutes a complete severance of the employer-employee relationship, eliminating the necessary prerequisite for disability retirement—the right to return to service, under circumstances where the employee's departure was not related to a disabling medical condition and occurred during misconduct proceedings.

The Rule of In re Marriage of Hoch is that a family court abuses its discretion under Family Code section 271 by imposing sanctions against a party for refusing to stipulate to permit the opposing party to amend a petition from legal separation to dissolution of marriage, under circumstances where the refusal is based on conscientiously held religious beliefs and the moving party could have avoided the costs by initially filing a dissolution petition.

The Rule of Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan is that a contractual exclusion limiting evidence use only applies to valuations "under" the specific regulatory provision cited, and does not preclude use of the same evidence in quantum meruit valuations which are separate and distinct from regulatory determinations, under circumstances where the exclusion clause specifically references only determinations made pursuant to a particular regulation subsection.

The Rule of Clarke v. Yu is that oral or implied joint venture agreements are subject to the statute of frauds if the agreement, by its terms, cannot be performed within a year from its making, under circumstances where the joint venture's purpose involves activities that cannot possibly be completed within one year.

The Rule of People v. Riggs is that an attorney's temporary administrative suspension from the State Bar for trust account reporting violations does not per se constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, under circumstances where the attorney was suspended for administrative noncompliance rather than resignation with disciplinary charges pending.

The Rule of Dion v. Weber is that under the Victims of Corporate Fraud Compensation Fund statutory scheme, trial courts are precluded from relitigating the merits of underlying fraud judgments when evaluating payment claims from the fund, under circumstances where the Secretary of State denies payment based on challenges to the validity of the original fraud judgment.