California Legal Brief

The Rule of Wright v. WellQuest Elk Grove, LLC is that an arbitration agreement clause stating "an arbitrator will decide any question about whether a claim or dispute must be arbitrated" does not clearly and unmistakably delegate threshold arbitrability issues (including unconscionability and enforceability) to the arbitrator, under circumstances where the language is silent as to interpretation and enforceability issues and lacks specificity about applicable arbitration rules.

The Rule of People v. Perez is that impoundment of a legally parked vehicle solely to prevent future unlawful driving by an unlicensed driver does not satisfy the Fourth Amendment's community caretaking function, under circumstances where the vehicle poses no present danger to public safety or traffic flow.

The Rule of City of Riverside v. RLI Insurance Company is that an additional insured has standing to sue both the named insured and the insurer in the same action for breach of contract and bad faith claims, under circumstances where the plaintiff is a first-party additional insured with privity of contract rather than a third-party tort claimant.

The Rule of 360 So Reeves, LLC v. Jeff Dutton is that a lessor's noncompliance with Civil Code section 1962 is an affirmative defense for which the lessee bears the burden of proof, under circumstances where a successor landlord allegedly failed to provide proper notice of change of ownership and service of process information to a residential tenant.

The Rule of The Merchant of Tennis is that when employers obtain individual settlement agreements from putative class members through fraud or misrepresentation, a curative notice must inform those employees that rescinding their agreements to join the class action may require repayment of settlement funds at the conclusion of litigation, under Civil Code sections 1689, 1691, and 1693, even though the trial court retains discretion to adjust equities between the parties at judgment.

The Rule of Melissa I. Aerni et al. v. RR San Dimas, L.P., et al. is that Civil Code section 1940.1 does not require individualized proof that each plaintiff used a residential hotel as their own primary residence, under circumstances where plaintiffs seek class certification for violations of the statute's prohibition against the "28-day shuffle."

The Rule of Meiner is that Apple Pay accounts constitute "financial accounts" under probation search terms that exclude such accounts from warrantless searches, under circumstances where the probation conditions explicitly exclude "financial accounts" from the search authorization and the Apple Pay account is licensed as a money transmitter and regulated by financial authorities.

The Rule of Department of Water Resources Cases is that a public entity with eminent domain authority may conduct precondemnation entry and testing activities under Code of Civil Procedure section 1245.010 et seq.

The Rule of The Merchant of Tennis is that when putative class members rescind individual settlement agreements obtained through fraud or duress to join a class action lawsuit, they must be notified in the curative notice that they could be responsible for repayment of settlement consideration at the conclusion of litigation pursuant to Civil Code sections 1689, 1691, and 1693, under circumstances where an employer has obtained nearly 1,000 individual settlement agreements from employees during pending class certification proceedings through misrepresentations about the litigation.

The Rule of Albarghouti is that the California False Claims Act creates a 60-day default sealing period, after which the seal lifts automatically absent the government's request for an extension, under circumstances where a qui tam plaintiff files the complaint in camera, serves the Attorney General by certified mail, and the government neither requests a seal extension nor provides notice of its intervention decision within 60 days.

The Rule of People v. Espiritu is that when a trial court fails to make a meaningful inquiry into whether proffered reasons for exercising peremptory challenges fall into presumptively invalid categories under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, the defendant's initial objection under the statute preserves appellate review of that procedural failure, under circumstances where defense counsel objected to a peremptory challenge but did not specifically identify the potential presumptive invalidity below.

The Rule of Department of Water Resources Cases is that Water Code section 250 and 11580 project authorization and funding requirements do not apply to precondemnation entry and testing activities under Code of Civil Procedure section 1245.010, under circumstances where a public entity with eminent domain authority seeks temporary access to conduct investigations to determine property suitability for future condemnation.

The Rule of Zand v. Sukumar is that an appellant cannot use the doctrine of voidness to collaterally attack a final appellate judgment by claiming trial court orders were void, when the challenged orders rest on errors that are merely in excess of jurisdiction rather than fundamental jurisdictional defects, under circumstances where the appellant has already appealed the underlying orders and lost.

The Rule of Walton v. Victor Valley Community College District is that postsecondary nursing students performing required clinical rotations qualify as "unpaid interns" under FEHA regardless of their student status, and are entitled to protection from sexual harassment and discrimination, under circumstances where District faculty supervise the clinical work and control the details of the internship.

The Rule of People v. Harzan is that a trial court prejudicially violates a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense when it conditions the exclusion of highly prejudicial prior misconduct evidence on the defendant's waiver of an entrapment defense, under circumstances where the prior misconduct evidence is not relevant to the objective entrapment standard under California law.

The Rule of Sam Cleare et al. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County is that a school district cannot claim impossibility as a defense to teacher credentialing requirements without first exhaustively pursuing all statutory alternatives, including requesting waivers from the Commission on Teacher Credentialing and State Board of Education, under circumstances where the district acknowledges non-compliance with teacher vacancy and substitute teacher limitations.

The Rule of Paknad v. Superior Court is that when an employer defends against an employee's discrimination lawsuit by asserting an avoidable consequences defense based on the scope and adequacy of its internal investigation, the employer waives attorney-client privilege and work product protection as to all factual findings about the employee's allegations and information relevant to the investigation's scope and adequacy, under circumstances where the employer voluntarily put the investigation's thoroughness and independence at issue in its pleadings and discovery responses.

The Rule of Martinez v. Sierra Lifestar, Inc. is that a defendant's argument that bonuses were discretionary or in the nature of gifts does not defeat typicality of a class representative's wage and hour claims when the same argument applies to identical bonuses paid to other class members, under circumstances where the employer used a uniform practice of excluding all such bonuses from regular rate of pay calculations.

The Rule of People v. Landrine is that a trial court may not find satisfactory performance in mental health diversion unless the defendant substantially complies with the requirements imposed on diversion, under circumstances where the defendant commits dozens of new crimes while in the diversion program despite express warnings that any new crimes would result in termination.

The Rule of Amezcua v. Superior Court is that trial courts may not condition leave to amend pleadings on payment of opposing party's attorney fees unless specifically authorized by statute or agreement between parties, under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(a) which contains no attorney fee-shifting provision.